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Transplanting Fair Use Across the Globe: A Case
Study Testing the Credibility of U.S. Opposition
NIVA ELKIN-KOREN† & NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL††
The fair use privilege of United States copyright law long stood virtually alone among
national copyright laws in providing a flexible, open-ended copyright exception. Most
countries’ copyright statutes set out a list of narrowly defined exceptions to copyright owners’
exclusive rights. By contract, U.S. fair use doctrine empowers courts to carve out an exception
for an otherwise infringing use after weighing a set of equitable factors on a case-by-case
basis.
In the face of rapid technological change in cultural production and distribution, however,
the last couple decades have witnessed widespread interest in adopting fair use in other
countries. Thus far, the fair use model has been adopted in a dozen countries and considered
by copyright law revision commissions in several others. Yet, ironically, U.S. copyright
industries—motion picture studios, record labels, music publishers, and print publishers—
and, in some instances, U.S. government representatives have steadfastly opposed the
transplanting of U.S. fair use to other countries. They argue, principally, that, while fair use
works reasonably well in the United States, foreign courts that lack the 150 years of U.S. fair
use precedent would likely apply the fair use exception in a chaotic, libertine manner, thus
seriously undermining copyright protection.
This Article tests the credibility of that blanket U.S. opposition. In so doing, we present the
first comprehensive study of how courts have actually applied fair use in a country outside

† Professor, Tel-Aviv University, Faculty of Law; Faculty Associate, Berkman Klein Center at Harvard
University.
†† Pete Kameron Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. We thank Tamir Afori, Jonathan Band, Lionel
Bently, Dan Burk, Carys J. Craig, Sean Flynn, Bernt Hugenholtz, Justin Hughes, Peter Jaszi, Howard Poliner,
Matt Sag, Aurelia Schultz, Luis Villarroel, and Peter Yu for their helpful written comments; Nitza Barkan and
Benjamin Nyblade for lending us their expertise in statistics; and Hadar Assis, Aaron Johnson, Aaron Schreiber,
and Netta Tauber for their invaluable research assistance. We have also benefitted greatly from participants at
conferences and workshops where we have presented earlier versions of this Article, including Israeli Copyright
Association-a Decade of Copyright Law, the Colloquium on Law, Society and Technology, University of Haifa
Faculty of Law, the Hebrew University Cyber Workshop, the Works-in-Progress Workshop at the Program on
Information Justice and Intellectual Property, American University Washington College of Law, and the Zoom
IPOW Workshop. Of course, we are responsible for all errors. Opinions expressed are ours alone. This research
was supported by The Israel Science Foundation (Grant No. 1820/17) and the UCLA Academic Senate. Unless
otherwise indicated, all English translations of Hebrew language sources are the Authors’.

[1121]

1122

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1121

the United States. We report the results of our study of the first decade of fair use case law in
Israel, which enacted a fair use exception as part of its copyright law revision in 2007. We
also compare Israeli fair use doctrine with that of the United States, drawing on parallel
empirical studies of U.S. fair use case law.
Our study plausibly supports two general conclusions of relevance to the global debate about
fair use. First, our findings counter the sweeping claim, advanced by fair use opponents, that
the adoption of fair use outside the United States will inevitably open the floodgates to massive
uncompensated copying and dissemination of authors’ creative expression. We find that, in
fact, Israeli courts have been far less receptive to fair use defenses than have U.S. courts. Far
from seeing fair use as a “free ticket to copy,” Israeli courts actually ruled against fair use
at a far greater rate than did their American counterparts during the ten-year period of our
study.
Second, our case study suggests that in one respect U.S. copyright industries raise a valid
point: local courts will, indeed, develop distinct versions of fair use doctrine in line with their
local jurisprudence and national policies.
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INTRODUCTION
The fair use privilege of United States copyright law long stood virtually
alone among national copyright laws in providing a flexible, open-ended
copyright exception. Most countries’ copyright statutes set out a list of narrowly
defined exceptions to copyright owners’ exclusive rights. Under such “closed
catalog” regimes, uses that do not fall within one of the narrowly defined
exceptions or limitations set out in the statute infringe copyright, unless licensed
by the copyright owner. By contrast, U.S. fair use doctrine, as codified in § 107
of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, empowers courts to carve out an exception
for an otherwise infringing use after weighing a set of factors on a case-by-case
basis.
Thus empowered, U.S. courts have given free rein to various new
technological uses of creative expression, as well as to copying from existing
works to convey new meanings, information, or aesthetics. In the United States,
Google’s Book Search Project—entailing the mass digitization of university
library collections to create a searchable database of millions of books—was
held to be fair use.1 In France, a court held Google liable for copyright
infringement for the same Book Search Project.2
Yet, in the face of rapid technological change, the last couple of decades
have witnessed widespread interest in adopting fair use in other countries. Fair
use proponents emphasize that legislatures are hard pressed to enact new,
narrowly defined exceptions and limitations that keep up with the rapid changes
wrought by digital technology in markets and media for producing, distributing,
and consuming creative expression. Indeed, fair use advocates view the pliable
copyright exception as a vital engine “for innovation and investment in
innovation,” a driving force behind the dramatic success of American
technology companies.3 Nor, they argue, can a closed catalog of narrowly
defined exceptions capture the full panoply of creative, secondary uses that
enrich our culture, enhance our public discourse, or provide useful information.4
By contrast, judges can more adeptly apply open-ended standards and principles

1. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207–08, 225 (2d Cir. 2015).
2. Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 3e ch., Dec. 18, 2009,
79 PTCJ 226 (Fr.).
3. IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 44
(2011), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
32563/ipreview-finalreport.pdf [hereinafter HARGREAVES REVIEW]; see also AUSTRALIAN L. REFORM COMM’N,
COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT 104–08 (2013), https://www.alrc.gov.au/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/final_report_alrc_122_2nd_december_2013_.pdf (lauding fair use as an engine for
innovation); COPYRIGHT REV. COMM., MODERNISING COPYRIGHT 93 (2013), https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/
Publications/Publication-files/CRC-Report.pdf (advocating adoption of fair use to spur innovation in Ireland).
For a seminal discussion of how fair use might spur innovation, see Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation
Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2008).
4. See HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 3, at 41–52; AUSTRALIAN L. REFORM COMM’N, supra note 3, at
104–08.
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in cases brought before them to rule that certain socially beneficial uses do not
infringe copyright.5
Thus far, the fair use model has been adopted, with some variation, in
eleven countries.6 They include the Philippines (1997),7 Liberia (1997),8 Taiwan
(1997),9 Sri Lanka (2003),10 Singapore (2004),11 Canada (2004),12 Israel
(2007),13 South Korea (2011),14 Malaysia (2012),15 Kenya (2014),16 and, still

5. See HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 3, at 44.
6. For a helpful collection and typology of fair use model adoptions, see JONATHAN BAND & JONATHAN
GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK (2013); Peter K. Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants,
7 LAWS, Feb. 26, 2018, at 1. Fair use is not the only open-ended copyright exception that proponents have
advanced. Some proposals would fashion an open-ended copyright exception from the three-step test set out in
several multilateral intellectual property treaties as a limit on permissible copyright exceptions and limitation.
See, e.g., ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6 (2006),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228849/011
8404830.pdf.
7. Section 185.1 of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines is virtually identical to § 107 of the
U.S. Copyright Act, except that it states explicitly that the decompilation of a computer program “may also
constitute fair use.” INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 185.1, Rep. Act. No. 8293 (Phil.).
8. Section 2.7 of the Copyright Law of the Republic of Liberia was virtually identical to § 107 of the U.S.
Copyright Act. 24 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS § 2.7 (Liber.) (repealed 2016). The Liberian Copyright Law was
repealed in 2016, but it was replaced by a new law, of which § 9.8 is also virtually identical to § 107 of the U.S.
Copyright Act. Liberia Intellectual Property Act, 2016, § 9.8 (Liber.).
9. Copyright Act 2016, art. 65 (Taiwan), https://topic.tipo.gov.tw/copyright-tw/cp-441-856386-81cce301.html (click “108 Copyright (English)” to download). The phrase “or other conditions of fair use,” giving
courts discretion to permit uses other than those enumerated in the statute, was added in 1997. See id.
10. Section 11 of Sri Lanka’s Intellectual Property Act is virtually identical to § 107 of the U.S. Copyright,
but includes a long list of specific uses that are to be permitted without the copyright owner’s authorization and
refers to those uses as “acts of fair use.” Intellectual Property Act No. 36 of 2003, §§ 11–12 (Sri Lanka).
11. Copyright Act 2006, ch. 63, §§ 35–37 (Sing.) (setting out a “fair dealing” exception that is structured
as an open-ended fair use exception).
12. Canada’s fair dealing exception was long thought to provide a closed list of uses that could qualify for
the exception. But beginning in 2004, the Canadian Supreme Court has ruled that the specific permitted uses
enumerated in Canada’s fair dealing statute must be given a large and liberal interpretation and thus impose a
low threshold, and that, in determining fairness, courts are to apply factors that overlap with those of U.S. fair
use. Those rulings, together with Canadian Parliament’s addition of parody, satire, and education to the list of
enumerated uses, has brought a leading Canadian copyright scholar to conclude that “the current Canadian fair
dealing regime now more closely resembles a flexible, open-ended fair use model.” Michael Geist, Fairness
Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair Dealing to Fair Use, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 157, 159 (Michael
Geist ed., 2013) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY]; see also Ariel Katz, Fair Use 2.0: The Rebirth of Fair
Dealing in Canada, in COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY, supra, at 93.
13. We discuss the relevant provision, Section 19 of Israel’s Copyright Law 2007, in detail in the text
below. See infra Part III.
14. Copyright Act, No. 432, Jan. 28, 1957, amended by Act No. 14,083, Mar. 22, 2016, ch. 2, § 4, art. 353 (S. Kor.), translated in KOREA COPYRIGHT COMM’N, https://www.copyright.or.kr/eng/laws-andtreaties/copyright-law/chapter02/section04.do; see also Sang Jo Jong, Fair Use in Korea, INFOJUSTICE (Feb. 27,
2017), http://infojustice.org/archives/37819 (offering a brief discussion of the origin and operation of the fair
use provision in South Korea).
15. Copyright Act 1987, Act 332, amended by Copyright (Amendment) Act 2012, Act A1420, §§ 9, 13
(Malay.), translated in BAND & GERAFI, supra note 6, at 38.
16. See Victor B. Nzomo, In the Public Interest: How Kenya Quietly Shifted from Fair Dealing to Fair
Use (WIPO-WTO IP Colloquium Papers, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929252
(discussing Commc’ns Comm’n of Kenya v. Royal Media Servs. Ltd. [2014] eKLR (Kenya)).
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tentatively, South Africa (2018).17 In those countries, courts thus now have
discretion, albeit typically not unbridled discretion, to apply factors akin to those
set out in § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act to permit uses that are not explicitly
enumerated as copyright exceptions in the country’s copyright statute.18 China
also appears poised to adopt such an open-ended copyright exception in a
proposed revision to its copyright law, and some Chinese courts have already
asserted the authority to permit uses that do not appear in the closed list of
exceptions currently enumerated in China’s copyright statute.19 Copyright
revision commissions in Australia, the European Union, Hong Kong, Ireland,
Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have considered, or are
considering, adopting elements of fair use in those jurisdictions as well.20
Yet, U.S. copyright industries—motion picture studios, record labels,
music publishers, and print publishers—and, in some instances, U.S.
government representatives have steadfastly opposed the transplanting of U.S.
fair use to other countries. U.S. copyright industries have actively lobbied other
countries not to adopt the U.S. fair use privilege. Further, the Intellectual

17. Copyright Amendment Bill B 13B—2017 (S. Afr.). The bill has been enacted but not yet signed into
law. As of this writing, South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa has returned the Copyright Amendment to
the Parliament for reconsideration. Mike Palmedo, South Africa’s Copyright Amendment Bill Returned to
Parliament for Further Consideration, INFOJUSTICE (June 22, 2020), https://infojustice.org/archives/42426.
Peter Yu has authored especially helpful, illuminating studies of fair use variants in other countries. See Yu,
supra note 6; Peter K. Yu, Fair Use and Its Global Paradigm Evolution, 2019 ILL. L. REV. 111 (2019).
18. In some countries, the list of enumerated uses in the fair use provision imposes a degree of constraint
on the court’s discretion. For example, as we discuss below, while the U.S. fair use provision sets out a list of
favored uses that are entirely illustrative examples, Israel’s fair use provision sets out a list of uses that is
understood to impose some outside limit on which types of uses may qualify as fair use. See infra Part III.B; cf.
Sean Flynn & Mike Palmedo, The User Rights Database: Measuring the Impact of Copyright Balance 9 (Am.
U. Wash. Coll. of L., Program on Info. Just. & Intell. Prop., Working Paper No. 2017-03, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3082371 (characterizing “fair use” as completely open,
flexible, and general).
19. See Yu, supra note 6, at 11 (describing China’s proposed Article 43). In 2013, the Beijing Higher Court
ruled that, in exceptional circumstances, uses that are not among the enumerated exceptions in China’s Copyright
Law may qualify as permitted uses. Yong Wan, Similar Facts, Different Outcomes: A Comparative Study of the
Google Books Project Case in China and the United States, 63 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 573, 578–86 (2016)
(describing Google, Inc. v. Shen Wang, No. 1221 Gaominzhongzi (Beijing Higher Ct. 2013)).
20. AUSTRALIAN L. REFORM COMM’N, supra note 3, at 123–60 (recommending the introduction of a fair
use exception); Commission Report on the Responses to the Public Consultation on the Review of the EU
Copyright Rules, Directorate General Internal Market and Services, at 33–36 (July 2014) (reporting on
consultations regarding whether the E.U. should provide for greater flexibility for copyright exceptions and
limitations, including in the form of a fair use provision); COPYRIGHT REV. COMM., supra note 3, at 93–94
(recommending the introduction of the fair use exception as a new Section 49A of the Irish Copyright and
Related Rights Act); Legislative Council, Amendments to Be Moved by the Honourable Chan Kam-Lam, SBS,
JP 4, LC Paper No. CB(3) 219/15-16 (2015) (H.K.), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/counmtg/papers/
cm20151209cb3-219-e.pdf (providing the text of the fair use proposal presented for legislative debate in Hong
Kong); HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 3, at 44–47 (discussing the potential adoption of the fair use doctrine
in the U.K.); GOWERS, supra note 6, at 61–68 (examining the same); Tatsuhiro Ueno, Rethinking the Provisions
on Limitations of Rights in the Japanese Copyright Act—Toward a Japanese-Style “Fair Use” Clause, 34 AIPPI
J. 159 (2009) (considering the adoption of a fair use clause in Japan). The New Zealand government considered
but rejected adopting fair use. See Lior Zemer, Copyright Departures: The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright
Dominion and the Case of Fair Use, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051, 1096 n.271 (2011).
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Property Alliance (IIPA), a leading copyright industry trade association, has
regularly cited countries’ “ill-advised” adoption of fair use in petitioning the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to exercise that agency’s statutory authority
to threaten those countries with trade sanctions for inadequately protecting
intellectual property rights.21 In turn, the USTR and U.S. Department of State
have joined with the copyright industries to oppose adoption of fair use in other
countries and in international copyright treaties, even though they have
repeatedly promoted global enactment of other provisions of U.S. copyright
law.22 They argue, principally, that, while fair use works reasonably well in the
United States, foreign courts that lack the 150 years of U.S. fair use precedent
would be highly susceptible to applying the fair use exception in a chaotic,
libertine manner, thus seriously undermining copyright protection.
This Article tests the credibility of that blanket U.S. opposition. In so doing,
we present the first comprehensive study of how courts have actually applied
fair use in a country outside the United States.23 We look to Israel as a case study
to test the claims of opponents of adopting the fair use model outside the United
States.
Israel’s legislature, the Knesset, enacted fair use as part of that country’s
general copyright law revision, codified in Israel’s Copyright Law 2007.24
Israel’s fair use provision, section 19 of the Copyright Law 2007, is a close
translation of § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act (with a couple key differences
that we note below). Yet, like in other countries that have considered adopting
fair use, U.S. copyright industries voiced the objection that transplanting fair use
to Israel would severely undermine copyright owners’ rights.25
We report below the results of our quantitative and qualitative evaluation
of the first decade of fair use case law in Israel. We also compare Israel’s fair
use doctrine with that of the United States, drawing on parallel empirical studies
of U.S. fair use case law.
Our study has significance for the global fair use debate, even recognizing
that Israel’s copyright law and legal system may well differ in important respects
from those of other countries.26 As noted above, ours is the first comprehensive

21. See infra text accompanying notes 128–138.
22. See Yu, supra note 6, at 3–4 (noting that the United States has pushed other countries to adopt broad
protections for copyright holders found in the U.S. Copyright Act but has actively opposed the adoption of fair
use in domestic legislation and treaties).
23. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its Politics—At Home and Abroad, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF
LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 234, 261 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017) (“It is time to start monitoring [the
jurisdictions that have adopted fair use] to see how the new provisions are being applied by courts . . . .”).
24. Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH 2119 38 (Isr.). Prior to enactment of that general copyright revision,
which took effect on May 25, 2008, the Israeli copyright law was the U.K. Copyright Act of 1911, as
supplemented and amended by the U.K. Copyright Ordinance of 1924. See Michael D. Birnhack, Hebrew
Authors and English Copyright Law in Mandate Palestine, 12 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 201, 205, 208–10 (2011).
25. See infra notes 205–209 and accompanying text.
26. Given that Israel’s legal system is a common law system, our study does not address the claim that fair
use, as a creature of the common law, has no place in civil law systems. For an illuminating critique of that
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study of how courts outside the United States have applied fair use. In addition,
Israel’s adoption of fair use has been repeatedly cited in deliberations in other
countries that are considering whether to follow suit.27 Israel’s experience with
fair use might be viewed with particular interest in other countries given Israel’s
prominence as a knowledge-based economy, sometimes called start-up nation,28
where the high-tech industry and technological innovation are important drivers
of economic growth. Fair use proponents argue that in such an environment,
which relies on frequent technological advances, the flexibility offered by fair
use is likely to be essential.29
Our study plausibly supports two general conclusions of relevance to the
global debate about fair use.30 First, our findings counter the sweeping claim,
repeatedly advanced by U.S. copyright industries and other fair use opponents,
that the adoption of fair use outside the United States will inevitably open the
floodgates to massive uncompensated copying and dissemination of authors’
creative expression. As we discuss, far from seeing fair use as a “free ticket to
copy,” Israeli courts actually ruled against fair use at a far greater rate than did
their American counterparts during the ten-year period of our study.
Of course, whatever has been Israel’s experience, courts in Liberia, South
Africa, or another country might still interpret fair use in some manner that U.S.
copyright industries regard as anathema. But Israeli case law following Israel’s
enactment of fair use demonstrates that the mere fact that judges outside the
United States lack the experience of U.S. judges in applying fair use and the
guidance of decades of U.S. fair use precedent does not necessarily lead to a
chaotic or wide-open interpretation of fair use. Indeed, the Israel experience thus
far raises the distinct possibility that courts in other countries might apply the
user privilege more narrowly than do their U.S. counterparts. At the very least,
U.S. opposition to transplanting fair use should be assessed against additional
case studies of how fair use has actually been applied in other countries.
Certainly, the USTR should give no weight to the mere fact that a country has
adopted fair use in determining whether that country adequately protects
intellectual property rights within the meaning of U.S. trade law.
Second, our case study suggests that in one respect U.S. copyright
industries raise a valid point: local courts will, indeed, develop distinct versions
of fair use doctrine in line with their local jurisprudence and national policies.
claim, see Martin Senftleben, The Perfect Match: Civil Law Judges and Open-Ended Fair Use Provisions, 33
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 231 (2017).
27. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS:
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INQUIRY REPORT NO. 78, at 9 (2016), https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/
intellectual-property/report/intellectual-property-overview.pdf; HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 3, at 45.
28. DAN SENOR & SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION: THE STORY OF ISRAEL’S ECONOMIC MIRACLE (2009).
29. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Cooley, Pub. Pol’y and Gov’t Rels. Couns., Google Austl., to Dir.,
Copyright L. Section, Dep’t of Commc’ns and the Arts (July 4, 2018), https://www.communications.gov.au/
sites/default/files/submissions/google_0.pdf?acsf_files_redirect.
30. We take no position on claims of U.S. technology companies and other fair use proponents that fair
use is highly conducive to technological innovation. Such claims are beyond the scope of our study of case law.
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The courts might cite leading U.S. fair use cases. However, they are unlikely to
coalesce around a single, uniform, America-led version of fair use. Indeed,
courts might develop distinct local variants of fair use even in countries, like
Israel, where the legislature enacts a fair use provision that closely tracks the
language of § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act.
Israel’s experience should be no surprise. Local variation is what the
scholarly literature on legal transplants tells us to expect. Courts in countries that
purport to transplant statutory regimes from elsewhere generally come to
interpret—and effectively alter—the transplanted foreign law in line with local
conditions, legal traditions, and jurisprudence.31 Israel’s adoption of fair use, in
near-literal translation of the American statute, is a prime example of that
phenomenon. As interpreted by Israeli courts, fair use looks quite different from
the doctrine that courts have developed in the United States. Such local variation
does not mean, however, that transplanting fair use will inevitably lead to
massive uncompensated copying. That clearly has not been the case in Israel.
Our discussion proceeds as follows. In Part I, we briefly explicate U.S. fair
use doctrine and further contrast it with copyright laws that provide a closed list
of exceptions. In Part II, we document repeated U.S. government and copyright
industry opposition to fair use in other countries and in international fora. In Part
III, we chronicle Israel’s adoption of fair use and the U.S. copyright industry’s
opposition to enacting fair use in Israel. Part IV presents our comparative study
of Israeli and U.S. fair use case law during the decade following the effective
date of the Copyright Law 2007 and in light of a more recent, landmark ruling
of the Israeli Supreme Court.32 In Part V, we conclude.

I. FAIR USE VERSUS CLOSED LISTS OF COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS
The open-ended, flexible character of U.S. fair use doctrine presents a
sharp contrast to the closed catalogue regimes in both civil law countries and
many countries that have adopted the British fair dealing exception. At the same
time, the differences between the two regimes are not as wide as might appear.
31. See Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: The
Life of a Legal Transplant, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1427 (2010) (discussing the transplantation and subsequent
adaptation and transformation of the Statute of Anne through judicial development); Sujit Choudhry, Migration
as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 16–
22 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006) (“Legal transplants could only occur if both the rule and its context could be
transferred between legal systems, an exceedingly unlikely prospect. In its new context, a legal rule ‘is
understood differently by the host culture and is, therefore, invested with a culture-specific meaning at variance
with the earlier one’. In other words, it becomes a different rule.”); Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to
Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal
Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004). As Peter Yu has illuminated with respect to fair use, countries might
also enact an altered version of a foreign statute to begin with, as the legislature seeks to tailor the foreign
transplant to local law, policy, and perceived needs. See Yu, supra note 6; Yu, supra note 17. Michael Birnhack
presents a cogent argument that courts should avoid reflexive transplantation of foreign doctrine and should,
instead, adapt foreign doctrine to local needs by understanding the doctrine’s theoretical underpinnings. See
Michael Birnhack, Judicial Snapshots and Fair Use Theory, 5 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 264 (2015).
32. CivA 3425/17 Société des Produits Nestlé v. Espresso Club Ltd. (2019) (Isr.).
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Fair use is more consistent and predictable than critics charge, and courts in
closed catalogue regimes have carved out a degree of flexibility in the face of
the regimes’ generally restrictive character. This Part fleshes out the
fundamental contrast between fair use and closed catalogue regimes but also
notes the ways in which courts have mitigated some of the sharp differences. We
also explicate central elements of U.S. fair use doctrine to provide background
for our comparative study of U.S. and Israeli fair use.
A. FAIR USE
Fair use is a creature of judge-made Anglo-American common law. The
doctrine is widely said to have sprung from Justice Story’s test for “a fair and
bona fide abridgement,” set out in his 1841 decision in Folsom v. Marsh.33 Yet,
fair use has even earlier roots. Its origins lie in fair abridgement cases litigated
in English courts of law and equity extending back to 1710.34
When Congress codified fair use in § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, it
maintained the doctrine’s judge-made character. Section 107 provides that
courts are to determine whether a defendant’s use qualifies as fair use on a caseby-case basis, using as guidelines four statutory factors that Congress gleaned
from prior case law. The court may also consider any other factor it deems
relevant. The four statutory factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.35

Importantly, the fair use claimant need not satisfy each factor in order for
the use to qualify as fair use.36 Nor are the four factors meant to set out some
kind of mathematical equation whereby, if at least three factors favor or disfavor
fair use, that determines the result. Rather, the factors serve as guidelines for
holistic, case-by-case decision. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “All
[factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the
purposes of copyright.”37
In that vein, in its preamble paragraph, § 107 provides a list of several
examples of the types of uses that can qualify as fair use. The examples, which
include “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, [and] research,”38 are often thought to be
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (2011).
17 U.S.C. § 107.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 107.

April 2021]

TRANSPLANTING FAIR USE ACROSS THE GLOBE

1131

favored uses for qualifying for fair use. Importantly, however, the list of favored
uses is not dispositive. Rather, fair use’s open-ended framework imposes no
limits on the types of uses that courts may determine are “fair.”39 As iterated in
the House Report to the Copyright Act of 1976, § 107 was meant to give courts
considerable leeway in adapting fair use doctrine to new circumstances and
technologies:
The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair
use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially
during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory
explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-bycase basis.40

Fair use jurisprudence since 1976 is very much in line with that
congressional intent. In interpreting and applying § 107, U.S. courts have
repeatedly exercised the flexibility accorded to them to determine the types of
uses that may qualify as “fair.” Notably, these include new uses made possible
by digital technology that Congress could not have contemplated in 1976 and
thus that do not appear among examples of uses enumerated in § 107. Courts
have made clear, for example, that user-posted remixes on social media, digital
sampling of recorded music, displaying copyrighted material in search engine
results, and mass digitization of books and other works may all qualify as fair
use, depending on the particular facts of each case.41 U.S. courts have also
recognized fair use in using existing works as raw material for new expressive
purposes and aesthetics even if the use falls outside traditional fair use categories
like scholarship, news reporting, and parody.42
Fair use’s flexible, open-ended character has led some critics, both within
the United States and without, to charge that the doctrine is arbitrary, ad hoc,

39. As the Supreme Court has stated: “The text employs the terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ in the preamble
paragraph to indicate the ‘illustrative and not limitative’ function of the examples given, which thus provide only
general guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair uses.”
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78 (citations omitted).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); see also Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 875–77 (1987) (summarizing the House hearings on fair use).
41. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1166 (9th Cir. 2007) (image search engine
results); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005) (determining that the fair
use defense may be available for digital sampling of sound recording even if de minimis copying defense is not);
Estate of Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 930 (E.D. La. 2017) (holding that digital sampling may qualify
as fair use but that fair use defense was not sufficient to support a motion to dismiss under the facts as alleged
in the complaint); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2016) (determining that sender
of DMCA notice to take down user-posted video featuring copyrighted music must consider fair use); Authors
Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2015) (mass digitization and search engine results).
42. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–10 (2d Cir. 2006) (use
of concert poster art for rock band biography); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–07 (2d Cir. 2013) (use of
photographs in artwork); A.V. ex. rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638–40 (4th Cir. 2009)
(use of student papers copied for plagiarism detection service).
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and unpredictable.43 Yet empirical studies of fair use case law have cast
considerable doubt on that claim. Contrary to the charge that fair use is wholly
unpredictable, the empirical studies uncover considerable order and consistency
in fair use case law. For example, Barton Beebe’s quantitative, empirical study
and regression analysis illuminates which factors and sub-factors exert the most
influence on fair use case law.44 Likewise, Pamela Samuelson finds consistency
in fair use precedent by creating a taxonomy of uses.45 She discovers greater
predictability of results when examining like cases based on the type of use than
when looking at fair use case law as a whole.46 Further, Matthew Sag presents a
regression analysis finding statistically significant correlations between case
outcomes and combinations of various factual variables, such as the legal
identity of the parties and whether the defendant used the plaintiff’s work as part
of a commercial product or service.47
In addition, one of us, Neil Netanel, has shown that identifying historical
trends in fair use case law makes further sense of fair use.48 The Supreme Court’s
1994 ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.49 initiated a dramatic shift in
fair use doctrine, a shift that took several years fully to take hold. In fundamental
ways, fair use is a different doctrine today than it was twenty or thirty years ago.
So, if we compare fair use cases from the 1980s to present-day cases, it is no
wonder that fair use might look like a chaotic mix of ad hoc, contradictory
decisions. By contrast, if we compare only cases decided over the past fifteen
years or so, we find far greater consistency. In particular, the issue that
overwhelmingly dominates fair use analysis today is whether and to what extent
the defendant’s use is “transformative,” a term that Campbell introduced to fair
use case law.50 But prior to the doctrinal shift initiated by Campbell, the
dominant questions in fair use analysis were, instead, whether the defendant’s
use was “commercial” and whether the use harmed the potential market for the
plaintiff’s work.51

43. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 716–17
(2011) (quoting critics).
44. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 549, 594–617 (2008).
45. Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541 (2009).
46. Id. at 2541–42.
47. Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 72–78 (2012); see also Michael J. Madison,
A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004) (presenting a more theoretical,
but also illuminating systematization of fair use doctrine).
48. See Netanel, supra note 43.
49. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
50. See Netanel, supra note 43, at 736–46; see also Clark D. Asay, Arielle Sloan & Dean Sobczak, Is
Transformative Use Eating the World?, 61 B.C. L. REV. 905, 912–13 (2020) (summarizing the results of their
quantitative empirical study showing that within the past decade the vast majority of both appellate and district
courts apply the transformative use paradigm in their opinions and that courts’ determinations of whether the
defendants’ use is transformative correlate with fair use outcomes at extremely high rates).
51. See Netanel, supra note 43, at 736–46.
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Jiarui Liu’s empirical research also highlights the emerging dominance and
far-reaching impact of the transformative use approach to fair use in the United
States. In his comprehensive study of fair use rulings from January 1, 1978 (the
effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976) to January 1, 2017, Liu found that,
in the decade preceding 2017, close to 90% of fair use cases considered whether
the defendant’s use is “transformative.”52 Moreover, if a U.S. court finds the
defendant’s use to be “transformative,” it will almost inevitably rule that the use
is a fair use (unless the court characterizes the use as only “somewhat” or
“minimally” transformative). Liu found that in 94% of cases in which the court
found the use to be transformative, the court went on to hold that the use was
fair use.53 By contrast, the same lopsided percentage, 94%, of nontransformative uses were held not to be fair use.54
The definition of what uses qualify as transformative is thus obviously key
to unpacking fair use doctrine. In that regard, first and foremost, a use is
“transformative” if the alleged copyright infringer has used the copyrighted
work for a fundamentally different expressive purpose from that of the work’s
author.55 Copying a work for purposes of parody or criticism of the original work
would be a paradigmatic transformative use.56
Importantly, a use for a fundamentally different expressive purpose may
qualify as transformative even if the alleged infringer copies the work in its
entirety without altering it.57 Google’s digitization of books was held to be
“highly transformative” because Google copied them and displayed short
snippets of text relevant to search queries for the “purpose of enabling a search
for identification of books containing a term of interest to the searcher,” not to
enable the public to read the books.58 The publisher of an illustrated history of
the Grateful Dead made a transformative use of images of Grateful Dead concert
posters that it featured in the book because the original posters served the
purposes of concert promotion and artistic expression, while the defendant
copied them as “artifacts to document and represent” historical events.59
More controversially, some courts have held that copying for the same
general expressive purpose, while using the original as raw material for a

52. Jiarui Liu, An Empirical Study of Transformative Use in Copyright Law, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 163,
166, 175 (2019).
53. See id. at 167, 180.
54. Id. A more recently published quantitative empirical study of all district court and appellate court fair
use opinions between 1991 and 2017 similarly concludes that fair use outcomes correlate overwhelmingly with
whether the court finds that the defendant’s use is transformative but also notes that only about half of defendants
win the transformative use inquiry. See Asay et al., supra note 50, at 913.
55. See Netanel, supra note 43, at 746–51.
56. See Samuelson, supra note 45, at 2549–56.
57. See Liu, supra note 52, at 170 (finding that of the decisions finding different expressive purpose, but
no physical modification of the original work, 60.7% found the use to be transformative).
58. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216–18 (2d Cir. 2015).
59. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–10 (2d Cir. 2006).
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“drastically different . . . aesthetic,” may also qualify as a transformative use.60
For example, the Second Circuit held that the artist, Prince, made fair use of
black-and-white photographs that depicted the natural beauty of Rastafarians
and their Jamaican surroundings.61 Key for the court was that Prince had
incorporated the photographs into hectic and provocative artworks that
manifested an entirely distinct aesthetic, with fundamental differences in
composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and media.62 Under that
reasoning, a user remix encompassing bits of popular movies and music
recordings would thus qualify as a transformative use if it combines those works
to produce a drastically different aesthetic, even without doing so for a different
expressive purpose such as criticism or documenting a particular facet of popular
culture.
Notably, as Liu’s findings indicate, while uses found to be transformative
will almost always be held to be fair use, non-transformative uses may also
qualify, albeit in relatively few cases. Most famously, the Supreme Court held
in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., that consumers’ analog
recording of television programs for later viewing was fair use.63 Lower courts
have subsequently extended Sony to digital recordings of television programs
and to reproducing a copy of a work that a consumer legally owns in order to
transfer it from one consumer device to another.64
Finally, of importance in comparing fair use to closed catalogue regimes,
fair use is not the only exception to copyright holder rights in U.S. law. Rather,
§ 107 stands alongside lengthy, detailed provisions, § 108 to § 122 of the
Copyright Act, that set out a long list of narrowly tailored exceptions and
limitations for uses ranging from public performance of music in retail
establishments to making audio and braille copies for the visually impaired. In
comparing the U.S. fair use model with closed catalog regimes, it is important
to highlight that U.S. fair use operates independently from those narrowly

60. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–07 (2d Cir. 2013). In his comprehensive study of transformative
use case law, Liu compares fair use outcomes for cases involving transformative purpose but no physical
transformation with those in which the defendant physically modified the copyrighted work but did so with the
same expressive purpose as original author. Liu finds that courts ruled in favor of fair use in 60.7% of the cases
involving transformative purpose but no physical transformation, but in favor of fair use in just 32.7% of the
cases involving physical transformation but no transformative purpose. Liu, supra note 52, at 207.
61. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698–99.
62. Id. at 706–07; see also Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176–78 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding a
rock band’s use of an artist’s illustration of a screaming face in a video backdrop of the band’s stage show to be
a transformative use because it was raw material conveying a different expressive message and meaning).
63. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–56 (1984). Recently, the Second Circuit
has sought to recast Sony as a transformative use case. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649,
661 (2d Cir. 2018) (“In Sony, the ‘apparent reasoning was that a secondary use may be a fair use if it utilizes
technology to achieve the transformative purpose of improving the efficiency of delivering content without
unreasonably encroaching on the commercial entitlements of the rights holder’ . . . .” (quoting Fox News
Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 177 (2d Cir. 2018)).
64. See, e.g., Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060, 1068–70 (9th Cir. 2014).
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tailored exceptions and limitations.65 No copyright holder authorization is
required for uses that meet the requirements of one of the specific exceptions or
limitations, even if the use would not qualify as fair use. And, unlike closed
catalog copyright systems, a use that does qualify as fair use is non-infringing
even if it does not fall within any of the specific exceptions and limitations.
B. CLOSED LIST COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS
1.

Civil Law Regimes

Until the late 1990s, the United States was the only country in the world
with an open-ended fair use privilege. Copyright laws of continental European
and other civil law countries typically set out a closed list of narrowly defined
permitted uses. For example, Article L122-5 of the French Intellectual Property
Code provides that once an author has disclosed his or her work to the public,
the author may not prohibit (1) “private and gratuitous performances carried out
exclusively within the family circle,” (2) “copies . . . reserved strictly for the
private use of the copier and not intended for collective use,” (3) “short
quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific or
informatory nature of the work in which they are incorporated,” “press reviews,”
and “the dissemination . . . through the press or by broadcasting, as current
news, of speeches intended for the public made in political, administrative,
judicial or academic gatherings,” (4) “parody, pastiche and caricature,” (5)
noncommercial reproductions made for purposes of conservation or
preservation and accessible from within publicly accessible libraries, museums,
or archives, and (6) a couple additional similarly narrow and expressly defined
uses.66 Similarly, the European Union’s Copyright in the Information Society
Directive of 2001 lists twenty specific exceptions and limitations that member
states are entitled to enact.67 Pursuant to the Copyright in the Information
Society Directive, E.U. country copyright statutes provide that copying or
publicly communicating a copyright-protected work in a manner that the statute
does not expressly identify as a copyright exception requires the copyright
owner’s permission and, absent permission, infringes the copyright owner’s
exclusive rights.
Further, courts may not fashion new exceptions, and the traditional rule in
many countries, including those of the European Union, is that copyright

65. See Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, in COPYRIGHT LAW
AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, supra note 23, at 12 (discussing policy justifications for and
interplay between fair use and enumerated exceptions and limitations in U.S. copyright law).
66. CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] art. L122-5 (Fr.).
67. Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 5, 2001 O.J.
(L 167) 10, 16 [hereinafter E.U. Copyright Directive].
IN AN

1136

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1121

limitations and exceptions must be narrowly construed.68 It does not matter how
socially beneficial the use might be or whether it is a type of use that the
legislature did not and could not have contemplated when it enacted the relevant
provision of the copyright statute. Consequently, Google’s scanning of millions
of library books was held to be infringing under French copyright law.69 For that
matter, Google’s library partners’ creation of a searchable database of those
books would also infringe because France’s exception for copying by libraries
and archives is limited to copying for purposes of preservation. By contrast, the
Second Circuit held that the digital copying of library books by Google’s library
partners to establish an online searchable database qualified as fair use, just as a
different Second Circuit panel held that Google itself had made fair use of the
books that it digitized.70
Of note, some closed catalog regimes also include an open-ended standard
like fair use. The E.U. Copyright in the Information Society Directive, for
example, incorporates the three-step test that has become standard in intellectual
property treaties, including the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.71 However, the three-step test
operates to impose a restriction on the specific exceptions and limitations set out
in the Directive, not as an open-ended, flexible exception like fair use.72 Article
5(5) of the Directive provides that the specific exceptions and limitations “shall
only be applied in [1] certain special cases which [2] do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and [3] do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.”73 Unlike fair
use, the Copyright Directive’s three-step test is not a freestanding exception that
may be applied even if the use falls outside the specific exceptions or limitations.
Nor are the specific exceptions and limitations independent from the three-step

68. But see P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright: Can the EU Author’s Rights Accommodate Fair
Use?, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, supra note 23, at 275, 284–86
(discussing the three-step test constraint and traditional rule of narrow construction but noting that recent
decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union “reflect a more liberal manner of interpreting limitations
and exceptions,” even while “still providing lip service to the rule of narrow construction”).
69. Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 3e ch., Dec. 18, 2009,
79 PTCJ 226 (Fr.).
70. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804
F.3d 202, 207–08, 225 (2d Cir. 2015).
71. See Guido Westkamp, The “Three-Step Test” and Copyright Limitations in Europe: European
Copyright Law Between Approximation and National Decision Making, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 3, 11
(2008) (discussing the three-step test in E.U. law); Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais & Martin Senftleben, The
Three-Step Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 581, 583–611 (2014) (discussing the historical evolution of the three-step test in international treaties).
72. See Westkamp, supra note 71, at 25 (concluding that in the context of the E.U. Copyright Directive,
the three-step test “must be understood so as to coerce member states to interpret existing limitations ‘in the
light’ of the three-step test, which results naturally in more restrictive legislative choices”).
73. E.U. Copyright Directive, supra note 67, art. 5(5).
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test. Per Article 5(5), a specific exception or limitation may only be applied in a
particular case if doing so would comport with the three-step test.74
2.

Fair Dealing Regimes

The United Kingdom and former British colonies and dominions that
followed its example provide for a “fair dealing” exception to copyright. Fair
dealing differs in some respects from the civil law approach to copyright
exceptions. But, today, fair dealing is also typically understood to permit only a
closed list of exceptions.75
Until 1911, United Kingdom fair dealing doctrine was much like American
fair use.76 Courts had wide latitude to determine fairness, unconstrained by any
statutorily mandated closed list.77 As such, U.K. courts permitted fair
abridgement as needed to prevent copyright from putting “manacles upon
science.”78 But that judicial discretion was sharply curtailed after Parliament
codified fair dealing case law in 1911. The U.K. Copyright Law of 1911
provided that “[a]ny fair dealing with any work for the purposes of private study,
research, criticism, review, or newspaper summary” did not constitute copyright
infringement.79 Courts interpreted that language to set out a closed list of
permissible uses—to mean that fair dealing could apply only for one of the five
types of uses enumerated in the statute.80 Former British colonies and dominions
such as Australia,81 Canada,82 India,83 New Zealand,84 and South Africa85
enacted similar closed-list versions of fair dealing. Likewise, of particular
relevance to our study, the U.K. Copyright Law of 1911, including the closedlist fair dealing exception, took effect in British Mandate Palestine following
74. Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, ECLI:EU:C:2019:624, ¶ 62 (July 29, 2019).
75. Singapore and Sri Lanka, two British Commonwealth countries that each recently enacted an openended exception modeled on fair use, are exceptions to that general rule. They continue to denominate the
exception as “fair dealing” rather than adopting the “fair use” appellation. See supra notes 10–11.
76. See Lior Zemer, Copyright Departures: The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright Dominion and the
Case of Fair Use, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051, 1074 (2011). See generally ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT
LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 155–233 (2010) (situating the fair dealing
exception within the general approach to copyright infringement in U.K. law prior to the Copyright Law 1911).
77. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Aikin (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163, 165; 17 Ves. 422, 426 (Eng.) (holding that “a
legitimate use of [a] publication in the fair exercise of a mental operation, deserving the character of an original
work” does not infringe copyright); Smith v. Chatto (1874) 31 L.T. 775 (Eng.).
78. Cary v. Kearsley (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680; 4 Esp. 168, 170 (Eng.).
79. Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46, § 2(1)(i) (U.K.).
80. As Ariel Katz has cogently argued, it is far from clear that Parliament intended to set out a closed list
rather than a list of illustrative examples. But courts in the U.K. and other countries have generally, albeit perhaps
not decisively, interpreted the 1911 fair dealing exception to set out a closed list. See Ariel Katz, Debunking the
Fair Use vs. Fair Dealing Myth: Have We Had Fair Use All Along?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 111 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Ng-Loy Wee Loon & Haochen Sun
eds., 2020).
81. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt III div 3 (Austl.).
82. Copyright Act of 1921, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s. 29 (Can.).
83. Copyright Act, 1957, §§ 51–52 (India).
84. Copyright Act 1994, ss 42–43 (N.Z.).
85. Copyright Act 98 of 1978 § 12 (S. Afr.).
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World War I and was incorporated into Israeli law upon the establishment of the
State of Israel in 1948.86
Courts in the United Kingdom and elsewhere have applied various judgemade factors to determine whether a use meets the test of “fairness.” But with
the notable recent exception of Canada’s Supreme Court, they have held that
even if the test of fairness is met, fair dealing cannot apply to types of uses that
are not listed in the statute.87 Rather, like the E.U. Copyright Directive’s rule
regarding the three-step test, “fairness” operates only as a constraint on applying
the exception to listed uses in particular cases. Even if a particular use falls
within one of the enumerated uses, it will not qualify as “fair dealing” unless it
would be “fair” to exempt the use from copyright holder authorization under the
circumstances.88 The United Kingdom’s current fair dealing provisions, as set
out in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, similarly enumerate a closed
list of exceptions to copyright, in line with the European Union Copyright
Directive.89
C. SOME PERSPECTIVE ON THE DIFFERENCES
The fair use and closed catalog models differ substantially in their basic
approach to carving out exceptions to copyright owner rights. However, the
differences are not quite as stark as might appear.
From the fair use side, as the empirical studies have shown, U.S. fair use
does not truly operate as a fully open-ended, standard-based regime in the sense
that courts exercise virtually unbridled discretion to weigh the equities in each
individual case. Rather, U.S. courts tend to coalesce around more precise rules
for standard fact patterns. For example, copying for purpose of parody, criticism
86. See MICHAEL D. BIRNHACK, COLONIAL COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN MANDATE
PALESTINE 283–84 (2012).
87. See L. BENTLY, B. SHERMAN, D. GANGJEE & P. JOHNSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 229 (5th ed.
2018) (contrasting the restricted, closed catalog approach of U.K. fair dealing with the general fair use defense
under U.S. copyright law).
88.
To claim fair dealing under U.K. law, a defendant must prove three elements: 1) the dealing must
fall into an enumerated category; 2) the dealing must be fair in accordance with common-law
criteria; and 3) there must be sufficient acknowledgement of the original work in cases of
criticism/review and reporting current events.
Seagull Haiyan Song, Reevaluating Fair Use in China—A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Chinese Fair Use
Legislation, the U.S. Fair Use Doctrine, and the European Fair Dealing Model, 51 IDEA 453, 469 (2011); see
also Graeme W. Austin, Four Questions About the Australian Approach to Fair Dealing Defenses to Copyright
Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 611, 616–17 (2010) (noting that to qualify for the fair dealing
exception in Australian law, the defendant’s use must both be “fair” and fit within one of the statutory
categories); Yu, supra note 17, at 124–27 (discussing closed catalog character of fair dealing).
89. Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, 36 & 37 Eliz. 2 c. 48, §§ 29–31 (U.K.). But see TANYA APLIN
& LIONEL BENTLY, GLOBAL MANDATORY FAIR USE: THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO QUOTE
COPYRIGHT WORKS 2–3 (2020) (arguing that Berne Convention Article 10(1), which requires countries to
provide a copyright exception for quotations that accord with “fair practice,” and the UK quotation exception
should be broadly interpreted to permit a broad spectrum of secondary uses and thus to serve as a flexible
exception akin to fair use).
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of the copied work, introduction of the work in evidence in litigation (unless the
copied work was initially created for possible use in litigation), and comparative
advertising almost always qualify as fair use.90 As such, fair use’s flexibility lies
in enabling courts effectively to tailor fair use for new uses, fact patterns, and
policy choices.
For their part, closed catalog regimes provide somewhat greater flexibility
than is often assumed. First, closed catalog regimes operate within a system of
constitutional and general private law that sometimes provides courts with
openings to find flexibilities outside the copyright statute. For example,
European courts have occasionally looked to the right to free expression
grounded in a national constitution or the European Convention on Human
Rights to interpret a copyright exception broadly or even to override the rules of
copyright.91 Likewise, in the Google Thumbnails case, the German Federal
Supreme Court ruled that even though Google’s display of images through its
image search engine did not fall within any copyright exception, Google’s use
of the images was lawful under the doctrine of implied consent.92 Germany’s
Supreme Court reasoned that the copyright owner had implicitly consented to
the use of her images in the image search service by making her images available
online without employing readily available technical means to block the search
engine’s indexing and display of the images.93
Second, a degree of flexibility can be obtained through narrowly defining
the scope of authors’ exclusive rights, in particular the right of adaptation (the
equivalent of the right to prepare derivative works under U.S. copyright law).
As Bernt Hugenholtz and Martin Seftleben point out, both Germany and the
Netherlands allow a degree of freedom to adapt another’s work when the
adaptation is sufficiently distinct from the underlying work.94 The relative
freedom to adapt is not defined as an exception to copyright holder rights.
90. See Samuelson, supra note 45, at 2550–53 (parody and criticism), 2592–93 (litigation), 2597–99
(comparative advertising); see also Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, 59 ARIZ. L.
REV. 161, 163 (2017); Justin Hughes, The Sub Rosa Rules of Copyright Fair Use, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
(forthcoming 2021) (characterizing fair use as a mechanism for courts to create specific exceptions that are akin
to rules). For a seminal discussion of the dynamic standards-rules continuum in property law generally, see Carol
M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
91. See, e.g., Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, ¶ 70 (July 29, 2019) (stating that freedom of expression does not justify a copyright
exception beyond those specified in the E.U. Copyright Directive, but that the right to free expression may
inform interpretation of a specified exception); see also P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin R.F. Seftleben, Fair Use
in Europe. In Search of Flexibilities 11 (Nov. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/228186530_Fair_Use_in_Europe_In_Search_of_Flexibilities (click “Download full-text PDF” to
download) (discussing the Germania 3 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany and the
Scientology v. XS4ALL ruling of the Court of Appeal of the Hague, both of which permitted extensive quotations
from copyright-protected works); Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Towards a European “Fair Use”
Grounded in Freedom of Expression, 35 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 34–37 (2019).
92. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 29, 2010, I ZR 69/08, paras. 14–15, juris
(Ger.), summarized in Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 91, at 12.
93. Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 91, at 12.
94. See id. at 26–27.
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Rather, German and Dutch courts narrowly construe the copyright holders’
exclusive right to adapt their work such that it does not extend to adaptations
that are sufficiently distinct.95 But the effect is similar. German and Dutch law
could conceivably give free rein to many uses that would qualify as
transformative uses under U.S. fair use law.
That said, the fair use model still provides courts greater flexibility to
devise a copyright exception for new technological uses, such as in the Google
Book Search case, as well as to permit exact copying for a different expressive
purpose, as in the illustrated history of the Grateful Dead case.96 For that reason,
several leading European scholars have advocated adoption of fair use, or an
open-ended exception based on the three-step test, under European law.97

II. U.S. AND COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY OPPOSITION
Motion picture studios, book publishers, and record labels have all asserted
the fair use defense in copyright infringement lawsuits brought against them.98
Nonetheless, copyright industry trade associations and lobbyists have resolutely
opposed the adoption of fair use outside the United States.
An early example involved the negotiations leading up to the landmark
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
adopted as part of the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1994. TRIPS requires WTO member countries to comply with
prescribed standards for intellectual property protection and authorizes the
imposition of trade sanctions against countries that fail to do so. In its initial
submission to the TRIPS negotiations, the United States delegation, working
closely with copyright industry associations, proposed that TRIPS allow
countries to provide for exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive rights only
in “clearly and carefully defined special cases which do not impair an actual or
potential market for the value of a protected work.”99 If the U.S. proposal had

95. See id.
96. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
97. See, e.g., Jonathan Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre-Piece—The Liberation of European Copyright
Law?, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COMM. L. 87, 90–91 (2010); Senftleben, supra note 26, at 243–
47; see also Alexandra Sims, The Case for Fair Use in New Zealand, 24 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 176, 190–96
(2016).
98. See, e.g., May v. Sony Music Ent., 399 F. Supp. 3d 169, 178, 187–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (denying
recording industry and other defendants’ motion to dismiss based on fair use defense); Bourne Co. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499, 508–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that a song Fox broadcasted in
an episode of Family Guy was fair use parody); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259,
1276 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding, in favor of publisher defendant, that the novel Wind Done Gone was fair use
adaptation of Gone with the Wind).
99. Communication from the United States, Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, pt. 2, art. 6, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/GN11/W/70 (May 11, 1990), https://www.wto.org/
gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100144.pdf. On the “capture” of the United States Trade Representative by
copyright industry interests to promote their domestic and international agenda, see Margot E. Kaminski, The
Capture of International Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977
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been adopted, TRIPS would have imposed a significant barrier to the adoption
of fair use in other countries. Under that proposal, indeed, § 107 of the U.S.
Copyright Act might have itself run afoul of U.S. obligations under TRIPS.
The U.S. proposal was profoundly antagonistic to fair use in two respects.
First, the proposal would have limited copyright exceptions to “clearly and
carefully defined special cases.” That language suggests that only specific,
narrow statutory exceptions are permitted, or, at the very least, that judicial
applications of an open-ended exception would be vulnerable to the claim that
the court failed sufficiently to define and delimit the special case held to enjoy
the fair use privilege.
Second, the U.S. proposal would have narrowed the permissible scope of
copyright exceptions to those that satisfy the fourth fair use factor: “the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”100 The
proposal would have made the absence of market harm a threshold requirement
for uses to be permitted, not just one factor for courts to weigh in determining
on a case-by-case basis whether a defendant’s use qualifies as fair use. Granted,
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, the leading Supreme Court ruling on fair
use when the United States submitted its TRIPS proposal, had characterized the
fourth factor as the single most important factor for courts to consider.101 But
even Harper & Row had not held up the fourth factor as a threshold requirement.
Moreover, in its 1994 ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court
reiterated that all four factors must be considered, and put considerable, if not
primary, weight on the first factor, in particular on whether the defendant’s use
is transformative.102
Ultimately, the U.S. proposal was rejected. Instead, TRIPS incorporates the
three-step test that has now become a standard provision in multilateral
intellectual property law treaties as well as in national and regional legislation
such as the E.U. Copyright in the Information Society Directive. TRIPS Article
13 provides that WTO member states “shall confine limitations or exceptions to
exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder.”103
Some commentators have argued that the U.S. fair use privilege might
exceed the permissible scope of copyright exceptions under the TRIPS Article
13 three-step test. They advance a number of arguments, principally that fair
use’s open-ended, flexible character—the fact that fair use enables courts to hold
that new uses, involving new technologies, not specified in the statute do not
(2014); Neil W. Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN
COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
101. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
102. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–80 (1994).
103. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
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infringe copyright—violates Article 13’s requirement that copyright exceptions
may be available only in “certain special cases.”104 In particular, they argue that
the “certain special cases” restriction implies that a copyright exception must be
legislatively confined to a narrow and specific purpose, much like the United
States’ rejected TRIPS proposal would have explicitly required.105 Other
commentators contest that proposition. They view Article 13 as more openended and flexible.106 Or they contend that fair use as actually applied by U.S.
courts meets the three-step test and that actual application is what matters.107
During a review of nations’ copyright laws undertaken by the TRIPS
Council in 1996, the European Communities asked the United States to “explain
how the fair use doctrine, as it has been broadly applied and interpreted by US
courts, particularly in connection with a ‘parody’ that diminishes the value of a
work, is consistent with TRIPS Article 13.”108 The United States responded that
“[t]he fair use doctrine of US copyright law embodies essentially the same goals
as Article 13 of TRIPS, and is applied and interpreted in a way entirely
congruent with the standards set forth in that Article.”109 In its response, the
United States further emphasized that fair use is bound by case law.110 The
response cites the Supreme Court’s statement in Harper & Row that the fourth
factor is the most important. The U.S. response further declares that “[i]n
applying the fair use doctrine, the courts have consistently refused to excuse uses
104. See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST 162–65 (2004)
(summarizing the views of European commentators Herman Cohen Jehoram and J. Bornkamm); see also
MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATIES, THEIR
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION § 5.55, at 284 (2002); Herman Cohen Jehoram, Restrictions on
Copyright and Their Abuse, 27 E.I.P.R. 359, 362 (2005); Andre Lucas, For a Reasonable Interpretation of the
Three-Step Test, 32 E.I.P.R. 277, 278–79 (2010); Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 117 (2000); SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986, at 482 (1987). Okediji, Fiscor, and Ricketson have since changed
their position, contending that fair use does comport with the three-step test. See Pamela Samuelson & Kathryn
Hashimoto, Is the US Fair Use Doctrine Compatible with Berne and TRIPS Obligations?, in PLURALISM OR
UNIVERSALISM IN INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 139, 140 n. 9 (Tatiana Eleni Synodinou ed., 2019)
(describing the commentators’ changing views); P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT 3 (2008),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/copyright_20080506.pdf (“The [three-step] test
most likely permits both discrete European-style limitations and broader fair-use-style exemptions, or possibly
a combination of both.”); World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Study on Limitations and
Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment, at 67–69, Doc. SCCR/9/7 (Apr. 5,
2003), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_9/sccr_9_7.pdf (discussing how some fair uses are
consistent with the test).
105. See, e.g., SENFTLEBEN, supra note 104, at 162–65 (summarizing the views of European commentators
Herman Cohen Jehoram and J. Bornkamm).
106. See, e.g., Geiger et al., supra note 71, at 612–16; Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 91, at 17.
107. See, e.g., Samuelson & Hashimoto, supra note 104, § 5.2.3.
108. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, United States—Review of
Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights, pt. IV(1), WTO Doc. IP/Q/USA/1 (Oct. 30, 1996). The European
Communities’ query and the U.S. response is quoted in full in WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 8:15
(2020 ed.).
109. PATRY, supra note 108, § 8:15.
110. Id.
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that go too far and interfere with the copyright owner’s normal markets for the
work.”111
In opposing adoption of fair use outside the United States, U.S. copyright
industries similarly take the position that U.S. courts have, in fact, interpreted
and applied § 107 in a manner that generally comports with the three-step test.
In so doing, they downplay the breadth, flexibility, and importance of fair use in
the United States. In their telling, U.S. fair use comports with the three-step test
only because U.S. courts have narrowly interpreted the exception. And they
argue that, unmoored from restrictive and precise U.S. precedent, courts in other
countries might well interpret fair use in an overly capacious, liberal manner that
would exceed the strictures of the three-step test.
We can see a prime example in the 2011 U.S. copyright industry
submissions to the United Kingdom’s state-commissioned Hargreaves Review
of Intellectual Property and Growth, which had solicited views on whether the
United Kingdom should adopt fair use and on whether fair use spurs
technological innovation and growth.112 In its submission, the Directors Guild
of America (DGA) stated that “the fair use doctrine provides only a narrow
affirmative defense to copyright infringement, and applies most frequently to
small samples of creative work used for commentary, education, and parody.”113
The DGA further stated: “The fair use doctrine does not explicitly account for
technological innovation, and the purpose of the fair use doctrine is not to
promote any particular type of technological innovation.”114 Similarly, the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) informed the Hargreaves
Review that because the U.S. Copyright Act contains fifteen specific and narrow
exceptions to copyright in addition to fair use, “this ostensibly ‘flexible’ system
is actually a fact-intensive, detailed code.”115 The MPAA further cited U.S.
Copyright Office advice that because the fair use defense is uncertain, “[t]he
safest course is always to get permission from the copyright owner before using
copyrighted material.”116
Of note, in these 2011 submissions, the copyright industries assiduously
ignored U.S. court rulings that had already taken a considerably more expansive
view of fair use. Most prominently, in its 1984 ruling in Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court held that consumer recording
111. Id.
112. HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 3, at 3–5.
113. Dirs. Guild of Am., Comments of the Directors Guild of America, Submission to United Kingdom
Independent Review of Intellectual Copyright and Growth 4–5 (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.dga.org/
Initiatives/~/media/Files/Internet%20Theft/Directors%20Guild%20of%20America%20Submissionto%20the%
20UK%20Independent%20Review%20of%20IP%20and%20CopyrightMarch%2032011.pdf.
114. Id.
115. Motion Picture Ass’n, Comments of the Motion Picture Association, United Kingdom Independent
Review Intellectual Property and Growth 11 (Mar. 4, 2011) (on file with authors). The MPAA has recently
rebranded itself as the MPA, eliminating the “of America” phrase to emphasize the film industry’s global
character.
116. Id.
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of television programs for later viewing is fair use and that, given that substantial
non-infringing use, the supplier of consumer video-recording equipment faces
no liability for facilitating copyright infringement.117 In so holding, the Court
reiterated that “[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the [copyright] monopoly . . . lie in the general benefits derived by
the public from the labors of authors.”118 Thus, the Court continued, “[w]hen
technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act
must be construed in light of this basic purpose.”119
Subsequently, in 2007, the Ninth Circuit held that Google’s display of
thumbnails of copyrighted images on its image search engine is fair use.120 In so
holding, the Court gave considerable weight to the fact that “search engines such
as Google Image Search provide great value to the public.”121 It reasoned that
fair use must be interpreted in line with the Supreme Court’s statement in Sony
that “[t]he purpose of copyright law is ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts,’ and to serve ‘the welfare of the public.’”122 And the Ninth Circuit
further relied on Sony in noting “the importance of analyzing fair use flexibly in
light of new circumstances.”123
As a final notable example, in 2006 the Second Circuit held that the market
for transformative uses does not count for purposes of determining market harm
under the fourth fair use factor.124 When the defendant’s “use of the copyrighted
images is transformatively different from their original expressive purpose,” the
court stated, “a copyright holder cannot prevent others from entering fair use
markets merely ‘by developing or licensing a market for parody, news reporting,
educational or other transformative uses of its own creative work.’”125
Since 2011, U.S. courts’ extension of fair use to new technological uses
and to uses held to be transformative has continued apace. The U.S. copyright
industries, however, persist in holding up their imagined narrowly delimited
portrait of fair use as the metric with which to measure whether fair use should
be adopted in other countries. They declare that they, of course, celebrate U.S.
fair use. But they insist that to adopt fair use elsewhere raises “serious questions
regarding consistency with the three-step test” because courts in other countries
lack the “many decades of [U.S.] case law and precedent” to ensure that the fair
use provision “is compliant with the three-step test.”126 Indeed, in the case of
117. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984).
118. Id. at 432 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
119. Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
120. Perfect 10, Inc., v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
121. Id. at 1166 (quoting Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848–49 (C.D. Cal. 2006)).
122. Id. at 1163 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl, 8;
and then quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 n.10).
123. Id. at 1166 (citing Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 431–32).
124. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614–15 (2d Cir. 2006).
125. Id. (quoting Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998)).
126. INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., 2019 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
141–42 (2019), https://www.iipa.org/files/uploads/2019/02/2019SPEC301REPORT.pdf (opposing adoption of
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civil law countries, they further argue courts do “not follow the legal principle
of stare decisis” and are not “bound by judicial precedent in the same way as
common law countries.”127
As such, the IIPA has repeatedly cited countries’ adoption of fair use in
support of its petitions to the USTR for placing such countries on the watch list
of countries that provide inadequate protection of U.S. intellectual property
rights and thus should face the threat of trade sanctions.128 For example, the IIPA
opposed Ecuador’s proposed addition of a fair use clause modeled on that of the
United States. It argued that Ecuador’s adoption of fair use would “undermine
copyright protection” given that Ecuador is a civil law system and Ecuadorian
judges “have no experience or training on the doctrine of fair use.”129 Similarly,
the IIPA has recently petitioned the USTR to deny South Africa developing
country trade preferences due to that country’s alleged failure to provide
“‘adequate and effective protection’ of American copyrighted works.”130 The
IIPA petition points to South Africa’s “ill-considered importation of the U.S.
‘fair use’ rubric,” arguing that “South Africa lacks the decades of legal precedent
that have served to define, refine, and qualify the fair use doctrine in the United
fair use in Ecuador). The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) is an umbrella trade association
representing the Association of American Publishers; Entertainment Software Association; Independent Film &
Television Alliance; Motion Picture Association of America; and Recording Industry Association of America.
About, INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., https://www.iipa.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
127. INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., supra note 126, at 141–42.
128. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, authorizes the President to take all appropriate action, including retaliation, against foreign government
practices that burden U.S. commerce. 19 U.S.C. § 2411. Pursuant to provisions referred to as “Special Section
301,” the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) undertakes an annual review of foreign countries’ intellectual
property law and enforcement. In turn, the IIPA submits an annual report to the USTR for the Representative to
consider as part of its annual review and determination of whether action is required to counter purportedly
inadequate protection and enforcement of U.S. intellectual property in foreign countries. Every year, the USTR
places some countries in one of three categories: “priority county,” “priority watch list,” or “watch list,” in
descending order of the extent to which that country has failed to provide adequate intellectual property
protection and enforcement. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, 7 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §§ 23.51–23.53 (2021 ed.)
(discussing the Generalized System of Preferences and “Special Section 301”); Judith H. Bellow & Alan F.
Holmer, “Special 301”: Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 259, 261–
63 (1989) (describing Special Section 301’s objective and requirements); Kaminski, supra note 99, at 988–1005
(describing the copyright industry’s extraordinary influence over USTR decision making in the Special Section
301 process and trade negotiations). The IIPA played an instrumental role in lobbying Congress to add the
Special Section 301 procedure to the Trade Act. See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION
FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 89–92 (2002).
129. INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., 2018 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
125–26 (2018), https://www.iipa.org/files/uploads/2018/02/2018_SPECIAL_301.pdf. A last-minute
amendment to Ecuador’s copyright legislation scuttled the open-ended fair use provision, making it applicable
only to specific exceptions enumerated in the statute. Id. at 125–27.
130. Letter from Kevin M. Rosenbaum, Couns., Int’l Intell. Prop. All., to Erland Herfindahl, Deputy
Assitant U.S. Trade Rep., Off. of U.S. Trade Rep. (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=USTR-2019-0020-0002 (click “Download File”) [hereinafter IIPA Petition]. The Trade Act of
1974 enables the President to accord favorable trade benefits to developing countries under the rubric of the
“Generalized System of Preferences” (GSP) and provides that the President is to consider, inter alia, whether a
country provides “adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights” in determining that country’s
eligibility for such developing country benefits. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(5).
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States.”131 The IIPA has also objected to the adoption, or proposed adoption, of
fair use in Canada,132 Japan,133 South Korea,134 Chile,135 Taiwan,136 Sri Lanka,137
and, as we shall see, Israel on similar grounds. In a number of instances, the IIPA
has insisted that countries that do adopt fair use must cabin the doctrine by
providing explicitly in their copyright statute that fair use is subject to the threestep test.138
U.S. copyright industries have likewise opposed the proposed introduction
of fair use in Australia and the European Union. In Australia, a common law
country, a number of government studies, conducted between 2006 and 2018,
favored adopting fair use. The MPAA and the American Association of
Publishers (AAP) repeatedly filed submissions opposing those proposals. For
example, in its 2012 submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission on
Copyright and the Digital Economy, the MPAA stated:
The enactment as part of Australian law of a new system based on the fair use
doctrine would not bring with it this century and a half of judicial precedent
[in the U.S.] that allows counsel, and the companies and individuals they
131. IIPA Petition, supra note 130, at 7, 71; see INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., supra note 126, at 70–71.
Similarly, in “talking points” prepared for State Department officials, the Motion Picture Association of America
recommended that the officials tell South African legislators that the fair use model is ill-advised because it
would “transfer power to make law in matters concerning copyright from Parliament to judges.” MPAA Talking
Points: Copyright Amendment and Performers’ Protection Amendment Bills (Nov. 18, 2018); E-mail from
Anjam Azziz, USTR Dir. for Info. & Intell. Prop., to Anissa Brennan, Senior Vice President of Int’l Affs. &
Trade Pol’y, Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. (Dec. 4, 2018) (on file with authors). In the wake of U.S. (and E.U.)
objections, South Africa’s President returned the Copyright Act Amendment to that country’s parliament for
reconsideration. See Palmedo, supra note 17.
132. INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., 2015 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
85–86 (2015), https://www.iipa.org/files/uploads/2018/01/2015_Special_301.pdf (objecting to Canadian
Supreme Court’s adoption and application of open-ended exception modeled on fair use).
133. INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
383 (2009), https://www.iipa.org/files/uploads/2018/01/2009_Special_301.pdf (opposing proposal to adopt fair
use in Japan given that “it would be extremely difficult to integrate this common-law doctrine into a civil law
copyright system such as Japan’s”).
134. See id. at 295 n.14 (expressing grave concern about proposal to adopt fair use in South Korea given
that “Korea is a civil law system which generally lacks the precedential background against which the U.S. fair
use exception has developed”).
135. INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
20 (2007), https://www.iipa.org/files/uploads/2018/01/2007_Special_301.pdf (opposing adoption of “‘fair use’like” exceptions in Chile).
136. INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., 2020 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
95 n.20 (2020), https://www.iipa.org/files/uploads/2020/02/2020SPEC301REPORT.pdf (opposing a draft
amendment to Taiwan’s copyright statute that would create a “catch-all” fair exception and insisting that all
exceptions “should be expressly confined to the three-step test”).
137. INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., 2003 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
595 (2003), https://www.iipa.org/files/uploads/2018/01/2003_Special_301.pdf (calling on Sri Lanka to narrow
its copyright exceptions and limitations, including fair use, to make clear that they comport with the three-step
test).
138. In its 2019 submission to the USTR, the IIPA maintains that “[s]ome copyright ‘reformers’ call for
broadly drawn exceptions to copyright protection that threaten to violate the cardinal global rule that such
exceptions and limitations be confined to those that meet the familiar ‘three-step test.’” It then cites the proposed
adoption of fair use by Ecuador, South Africa, and Canada as examples. See INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., supra
note 126, at vi–vii.
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advise, to rely upon the doctrine. Indeed, at its introduction, the new system
would be unsupported by any binding precedent at all.139

Likewise, the AAP’s 2016 response to the Australian Government
Productivity Commission’s draft report advocating adoption of fair use
highlights fair use’s case specific uncertainty:
[T]he radical uncertainty of the scope or applicability of the fair use exception
to any particular set of facts can be a debilitating cost . . . In the United States,
these costs are mitigated, principally by the existence of a deep and rich body
of case law and precedent . . . While this system works well in the United
States, AAP is skeptical whether it can be successfully transplanted to
Australia.140

For its part, in 2013, the European Commission solicited public comments
on whether the European Union should provide for greater flexibility for
copyright exceptions and limitations, including in the form of a fair use
provision.141 The MPAA, Sony ATV Music Publishing, and NBC Universal all
responded by adamantly opposing adoption of fair use in the European Union.142
They insisted that absent U.S. case law’s many decades of judicial interpretation,
transplanting fair use to the European Union “would be unwise and inevitably
bring chaos to the system.”143
Finally, at copyright industries’ urging, the United States opposed any
reference to fair use in the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published
Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print
Disabled.144 The Marrakesh Treaty, which was adopted in June 2013 and came
into force in September 2016, requires signatory countries to provide copyright
limitations or exceptions to facilitate the availability of copyrighted works in
accessible format to blind, visually impaired and print disabled persons (referred

139. Letter from Greg Frazier, Exec. Vice President, Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., to the Exec. Dir.,
Australian L. Reform Comm’n 3–7 (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/copyright-and-digitaleconomy/submissions-received-alrc#org (Submission 197 from MPAA) (click “RTF” next to “197 Motion
Picture Association of America” to download).
140. Letter by M. Luisa Simpson, Exec. Dir. of Int’l Enf’t & Trade Pol’y, Ass’n of Am. Publishers, to
Australian Gov’t Productivity Comm’n 3–7 (June 2, 2016), https://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0020/200918/subdr338-intellectual-property.pdf.
141. EUROPEAN COMM’N, PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE REVIEW OF THE EU COPYRIGHT RULES (2013),
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/modernisation-eu-copyright-rules-useful-documents (click
“2013 Public Consultation on the review of EU copyright rules” to download).
142. Motion Picture Association, Public Consultation on the Review of the EU Copyright Rules; Submission
to European Commission 5, 35–37 (March 5, 2014) (on file with authors); Sony/ATV Music Publishing,
Response to the Public Consultation on the Review of EU Copyright Rules. Submission to European
Commission 28 (Mar. 5, 2014) (on file with authors); NBC Universal, Public Consultation on the Review of EU
Copyright Rules. Submission to European Commission 15–16 (Mar. 5, 2014) (on file with authors).
143. NBC Universal, Public Consultation on the Review of EU Copyright Rules. Submission to European
Commission 16 (Mar. 5, 2014).
144. See infra notes 145–149 and accompanying text; see also Jonathan Band, Ambivalence to Fair Use in
U.S. Trade Policy, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (July 6, 2020), https://www.project-disco.org/
intellectual-property/070620-ambivalence-to-fair-use-in-us-trade-policy.
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to in the Treaty as “beneficiary persons”).145 The treaty further provides that
signatory countries may fulfill their treaty obligations through copyright
limitations or exceptions that “may include judicial, administrative or regulatory
determinations for the benefit of beneficiary persons as to fair practices, dealings
or uses.”146
While the draft Marrakesh Treaty was being negotiated, the MPAA sent
U.S. negotiators a memorandum objecting that the draft treaty “expressly
encouraged [signatory countries] to implement the proposed instrument by way
of fair use or fair dealing . . . without the need to pass by the three-step test in
each and every case.”147 The MPAA memorandum urged, accordingly, that “the
proposed instrument should omit a reference to specific ways of implementation,
in particular fair use and fair dealing, and subject all exceptions and limitations
as a general rule to the three-step test.”148
A confidential U.S. Department of State communication, subsequently
obtained through a Freedom of Information Request, reveals that government
officials sought to assuage copyright industry objections to the draft Treaty’s
reference to fair use. The communication, dated April 3, 2013, states:
I know [redacted name of person] is interested in the reference to fair
practices, uses and dealing on page 18 of the draft document. Quite frankly,
we think that this reference could lead to overly broad exceptions and, in the
interests of pragmatism, we think it would be best if we could drop this
reference. I believe [redacted name of person] has lobbied you on this, no?
Basically we think that removing this fair practices reference will be a big help
in getting consensus in the United States to negotiate the final parameters of a
binding agreement in Marrakesh.149

Ultimately, the reference to fair use remained in the Marrakesh Treaty. At
the United States’ insistence, an article was added requiring that, in meeting their
obligations under the treaty, signatory countries must ensure that their
limitations or exceptions for beneficiary persons comply with the three-step test
set forth in TRIPS and other international treaties.150
145. Marrakesh Treaty art. 4(1), June 27, 2013, 52 I.L.M. 1312 (2013).
146. Id. art. 10(3).
147. Memorandum from Motion Picture Ass’n on WIPO VIP Negotiations: Reference to Fair Use
Incorporation of Three-Step test 2 (April 4, 2013) (on file with authors), attached to e-mail from Scott Martin,
Exec. Vice President, Intell. Prop., Paramount Pictures, Inc., to Shira Perlmutter, Chief Pol’y Officer and Dir.
for Int’l Affs., U.S. Patent and Trademark Off. (Apr. 15, 2013) (obtained from U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
in response to Freedom of Information Request by James Love of Knowledge Ecology International). The
reference to fair use was added to the draft treaty text in November 2012, more than three years after the treaty
was formally proposed. Standing Comm. on Copyright and Related Rts., WIPO Draft Text of an International
Instrument/Treaty on Limitations and Exceptions for Visually Impaired Persons/Persons with Print Disabilities,
at 23, U.N. Doc. SCCR/25/2 (Nov. 23, 2012).
148. See Memorandum, supra note 147, at 2.
149. E-mail from Douglas P., Econ. Counselor, U.S. Embassy, to Carl Schonander, Dep’t of State (Mar. 26,
2013, 10:25 AM) (redacted e-mail obtained from U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in response to Freedom of
Information Request by James Love of Knowledge Ecology International).
150. See Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 145, art. 11.
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In sum, U.S. copyright industries and, at certain junctures, U.S.
government agencies have resolutely opposed the adoption of fair use in other
countries.151 In so doing, they have assumed that, at the hands of foreign courts,
unhinged from the “deep and rich body of [U.S.] case law and precedent,” fair
use would likely be construed so broadly, arbitrarily, and inconsistently so as to
bring massive legal uncertainty and significant harm to copyright holders.152 The
U.S. copyright industries’ concern applies with special force to civil law
countries, which the industries insist lack the tradition of adherence to precedent
upon which common law fair use doctrine depends. But the industries voice their
objection with respect to common law countries as well. The U.S. copyright
industries insist, accordingly, that other countries should not replace narrowly
defined, closed set limitations with fair use. And if other countries must adopt
fair use, their copyright statute must explicitly provide that fair use is subject to
the three-step test, which the U.S. copyright industries interpret to impose
significant constraints on judicial discretion.
Commentators have presented convincing arguments challenging the U.S.
copyright industries’ position. They question, first, whether, in the face of
dramatic changes in technology, closed list copyright exception systems really
yield more certain results than fair use.153 They also contest the notion that civil
law judges are ill-suited to developing a relatively stable and certain fair use
doctrine.154 Finally, commentators contend that, as properly interpreted, the
three-step test is not as constraining as the U.S. copyright industries imagine.155
We cannot further delve into those arguments in these pages. Rather, we
present Israel’s adoption and application of fair use as a case study that, at the
very least, calls into question the copyright industries’ blanket assertion that
other countries’ adoption of fair use doctrine will lead inexorably to chaotic

151. There are two notable exceptions. First, in July 2012, the U.S. Trade Representative, against the avid
opposition of the U.S. copyright industry, abruptly proposed language in the draft Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP) that would have encouraged countries to provide copyright exceptions loosely modeled on
fair use. The USTR’s abrupt embrace of fair use might have been motivated by its desire to curtail opposition to
the TPP in the wake of the stunning defeat of copyright-industry supported legislation in the United States and
of a copyright-industry supported trade agreement in the European Union earlier that year. Jonathan Band,
Evolution of the Copyright Exceptions and Limitations Provision in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(unpublished manuscript) (Nov. 10, 2015), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/band-tppfairuseversion11102015.pdf. The U.S. withdrew its signature to TPP in January 2017. As a result, the Agreement never
came into force. In another instance, the USTR pressured Hong Kong to adopt a fair use exception instead of a
broader blanket exception for reverse engineering of computer software. See Jonathan Band, The Global API
Copyright Conflict, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 615, 621 (2018).
152. Letter from M. Luisa Simpson to Australian Gov’t Productivity Cmm’n, supra note 140, at 3–7.
153. See Hugenholtz, supra note 68, at 282–83 (explaining why “the advantage of legal certainty that is
usually ascribed to the European system of precisely defined exceptions should not be overstated”).
154. See generally Senftleben, supra note 26.
155. See Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 91, at 20–23 (arguing that the three-step test should properly
be understood to give courts flexibility to interpret copyright exceptions and limitations liberally, thus effecting
a balance between authors’ rights and the broader public interest in accommodating new technological uses of
existing expression); Hughes, supra note 23, at 242–48 (suggesting that only specific judicial applications of
§ 107, not § 107 on its face, might violate the three-step test of TRIPS Article 13).
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uncertainty and judicial license for piracy, thus significantly undermining
copyright holder rights.

III. ISRAEL’S ADOPTION OF FAIR USE
In broad brush strokes, the United States and Israel followed similar paths
to adopting fair use. In both countries, fair use was initially formulated and
developed in case law, and subsequently codified as part of a general copyright
statute revision. But in Israel, the Supreme Court adopted fair use within the
framework of Israel’s pre-copyright revision, statutory fair dealing exception.
That landmark ruling has continued to influence fair use case law in Israel even
after the Knesset replaced fair dealing with fair use.
This Part fleshes out key elements of Israel’s adoption of fair use, focusing
on two milestones: first, the judicial incorporation of fair use into fair dealing,
and second, the codification of fair use in the Copyright Law 2007. With that
backdrop, we also foreground U.S. opposition to the Knesset’s replacement of
fair dealing with fair use. The next Part presents our empirical findings regarding
the first decade of case law following the effective date of the Knesset’s
codification of fair use in the Copyright Law 2007.
A. COURTS: MELDING TOGETHER FAIR DEALING AND FAIR USE
Israel’s Copyright Law 2007 replaced the U.K. Copyright Act of 1911,
which applied to British Mandate Palestine, and remained in force after the
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.156 As noted above, in the Copyright
Act of 1911, the U.K. Parliament codified the fair dealing defense to copyright
infringement. Section 2(1)(i) of the Act provided that “any fair dealing with any
work for the purpose of private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper
summary” did not constitute copyright infringement.157
The Israeli Supreme Court’s landmark 1993 ruling in Geva v. Walt Disney
Co. concerned Disney’s claim that Dudu Geva, a renowned Israeli caricaturist,
had infringed Disney’s copyright in its cartoon character Donald Duck.158 Geva
had authored a cartoon book that included a story centered on Geva’s cartoon
character Moby Duck.159 Moby Duck looked nearly identical to Donald Duck,
but Moby sported an iconic Israeli hat often worn by Kibbutz members in the
fifties and sixties. Geva’s story highlighted the subsequent decline of the
Kibbutz movement.160 Geva argued that his adaptation of Donald Duck in that

156. See Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46, § 37(2)(a) (U.K.); see also Copyright Law, 5768–2007,
SH 2119 38 (Isr.). The Copyright Ordinance was amended several times by the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset.
See id. The transitional provisions of the 2007 Law provide that the Copyright Act of 1911, 3 Annotated Laws
of Palestine 2475, and the Copyright Ordinance of 1924 continue to apply to certain matters. See id. § 78.
157. See Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46, § 2(1)(i) (U.K.).
158. See CivA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co., 48(1) PD 251 (1993) (Isr.).
159. Id. at 255.
160. See Birnhack, supra note 31, at 273 (describing factual background to Geva).
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context was protected free speech and a parody, which was permitted as
“criticism” under the Copyright Act of 1911’s fair dealing exception.161
The Israeli Supreme Court, which issued its ruling just two months prior to
the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal fair use ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., discussed pre-Campbell case law and commentary in considerable
detail.162 In so doing, the Court drew a sharp contrast between U.S. fair use
doctrine’s flexible, open-ended character and the closed-list U.K. fair dealing
exception then in force in Israel.163 The Israeli Supreme Court expressed a clear
normative preference for U.S. fair use. As the Court stated: “[T]he American
arrangement is much more advanced and is, when compared to the 1911 law, a
more desired arrangement. . . . It seems that the American legislator preferred to
create a flexible arrangement, one that enables maximal consideration in the
circumstances of each and every case.”164
While the Israeli Supreme Court ultimately held that it was bound to apply
the fair dealing exception in the Israeli statute, it ruled that each of the
enumerated uses was to be broadly interpreted given that the fair dealing
exception must reflect a balance between the rights of the copyright owner and
other public and social interests.165 In that regard, the Israeli Supreme Court
broadly interpreted the fair dealing category of “criticism.” It held that
“criticism” may include not only parody (for example, targeting the copyright
owner’s work for ridicule) but also satire (for example, using a work to target
some person, artistic genre, or social phenomenon other than the copyright
owner’s work).166
However, the Court further held that not every use for purposes of criticism
constitutes fair dealing. To qualify as fair dealing, the Court held, it is not enough
that the use falls within one of the enumerated types of uses in the statute—what
the Court termed the “purpose of the use test.”167 The use, rather, must also
satisfy a second requirement, that of “fairness of the use.”168 And the Court
adopted the four-factor analysis of U.S. fair use law, as codified in Section 107
of the Copyright Act, to determine fairness.169
In applying the “purpose and character” of use under the first factor, the
Israeli Supreme Court considered whether the use was commercial, and also

161. More precisely, Geva argued that Israel’s free speech jurisprudence required that the fair dealing
exception be broadly construed. See Geva, 49(1) PD at 256.
162. Id. at 272–82.
163. Id. at 270.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 273.
166. Id. (“It seems that the term ‘criticism’ for the purposes of article 2(1)(1) should be interpreted in a
broad sense. The freedom of speech and creativity, while they cannot change the law per se, do influence . . . the
shaping of the law through means of interpretation. Therefore, we recommend accepting a broad interpretation
and including critiques in the form of parody and satire in the category of artistic criticism.”).
167. Id. at 270.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 270, 275–76.
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whether it had promoted a new purpose, different from that of the original
work.170 The Court emphasized that satires and other socially beneficial uses
may sometimes qualify as fair use even if they are commercial. But the Court
was not convinced that Geva’s literal copying of Disney’s entire work truly
served any satirical effect.171 After considering all four factors, the Court held
that Geva’s use failed to meet the test of fairness. It accordingly rejected Geva’s
fair dealing defense.172
In sum, in Geva, the Israeli Supreme Court applied U.S. fair use doctrine
within the framework of the English fair dealing provisions, thereby creating a
two-pronged test. Under Geva, Israeli courts considering fair dealing defenses
had to determine, first, whether the purpose of the defendant’s use fell under any
of the purposes explicitly enumerated by the U.K. law, and second, whether the
use met the test of fairness of use based on the four factors of U.S. fair use
doctrine. A use could qualify as fair dealing only when both tests were met.
Following Geva, the hybrid doctrine of fair dealing/fair use remained the
dominant approach in Israel until fair dealing was finally replaced by fair use in
the Copyright Law 2007.
B. COPYRIGHT REFORM: FROM FAIR DEALING TO FAIR USE
The Knesset enacted fair use in section 19 of the Copyright Law 2007 as
part of a major copyright reform.173 As in the U.S. Copyright Act, the fair use
exception stands alongside, and independently from, specific exceptions and
limitations for particular uses, including the making of certain copies by public
libraries and archives,174 public performances in educational institutions,175 and
making certain transient and incidental copies.176

170. Id. at 276.
171. Id. at 283.
172. The Israel Supreme Court’s rejection of Geva’s fair use claim has been sharply criticized by later
commentators. See, e.g., Birnhack, supra note 31, at 275 (“The Court did not recognize the transformative nature
of the use and over-emphasized the (minor) commercial aspect.”).
173. The Act was passed by the Knesset on November 19, 2007 and came into force on May 25, 2008. See
§ 77, Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH 2119 (Isr.). However, pursuant to the Law’s transitional provisions, an
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work that takes place prior to May 25, 2008 and that qualifies as fair use will
not be deemed infringing. See id. § 78(c); see also TAMIR AFORI, THE COPYRIGHT ACT 540 (2012).
174. §§ 30–31, Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH 2119 (Isr.). These sections exempt certain uses in libraries
and archives of the type prescribed by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Education, for the purpose of
preservation.
175. Id. § 29.
176. Id. § 26 (permitting transient and incidental copies made as an integral part of communication
conducted by an intermediary network and making transient copies when necessary to enable lawful use of the
work, provided that the copy does not have significant economic value in itself); id. § 25 (permitting certain
recording of works for purposes of authorized broadcast); id. § 24 (permitting certain copying or making
derivative works of a computer program); id. § 23 (permitting certain broadcast or copying of works in public
place); id. § 22 (permitting certain incidental uses of works); id. § 21 (permitting certain copying of works
deposited for public inspection); id. § 20 (permitting certain uses of works in legal or administrative
proceedings); id. § 28A (permitting certain copying and adaptation to facilitate access to works for persons with
disabilities).
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The fair use provision under the Israeli Copyright Law 2007 is very similar,
but not identical, to the U.S. provision. Section 19 provides as follows:
(a) Fair use of a work is permitted for purposes such as: private study,
research, criticism, review, journalistic reporting, quotation, or
instruction and examination by an educational institution.
(b) In determining whether a use made of a work is fair within the meaning
of this section, the factors to be considered shall include, inter alia, all of
the following:
1) The purpose and character of the use;
2) The character of the work used;
3) The scope of the use, quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to
the work as a whole;
4) The impact of the use on the value of the work and its potential
market.
(c) The Minister [of Justice] may make regulations prescribing conditions
under which a use shall be deemed a fair use.177

The Ministry of Justice’s explanatory notes accompanying the proposed
new copyright law stated that, despite Geva’s instruction that the purposes
enumerated in Copyright Law of 1911’s fair dealing provision must be liberally
interpreted, the closed list provision presented significant practical difficulties
given the wide variety of uses of creative expression that advance the
fundamental purposes of copyright law.178 Further, it would be extraordinarily
difficult for the legislature to set out a comprehensive closed list enumerating
such a wide variety of desirable uses, especially given the increasingly expansive
reach of copyright holders’ rights under case law and the proposed legislation.
Accordingly, the Ministry of Justice explained, subsection (a) of the proposed
provision would provide an open list of purposes that would enable courts to
determine that worthy uses are non-infringing “fair use” and thus assist courts
in achieving balanced results in light of the expansion of copyright holders’
rights.179
With respect to the four factors set out in subsection (b), the Ministry of
Justice noted, again citing Geva, that in interpreting “fairness” under the fair
dealing provision, Israeli courts had largely adopted the arrangement set out in
the U.S. statute.180 In that vein, the Ministry explained—in language very much
in line with U.S. doctrine—courts are to consider the four factors but may
consider other factors as well.181 Further, no single factor should be

177. Id. § 19.
178. Draft Bill Copyright Law, 5755–2005, HH (Knesset) 96 1116, 1125 (Isr.), https://fs.knesset.gov.il/
16/law/16_ls1_584880.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Copyright Law].
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1126.
181. Id.
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determinative. Rather, all the factors should be weighed against one another to
determine whether a use qualifies a fair use.182
The Ministry of Justice also provided some explanation for each statutory
factor. Of note, the Ministry states, along the lines of U.S. fair use doctrine, that
the first factor is meant to distinguish between commercial uses and not-forprofit uses for study and research.183 By contrast, the explanatory notes do not
mention “transformative” uses.184 However, in presenting the proposed
copyright law revision to the Knesset committee considering the legislation, the
Ministry’s lead representative explained that the fair use provision was intended
to permit copying that has a clear public value, “which the American literature
has termed ‘transformative use.’”185 Finally, the explanatory notes state that the
fourth factor expresses, among other things, Israel’s obligation to comply with
the three-step test set out in TRIPS Article 13.186
The Ministry of Justice’s lead representative also explained that in
proposing the fair use provision, the Ministry intended to adopt the American
model, including not just the language of § 107, but also the case law regarding
it.187 As such, the Ministry opposed adding additional factors to section 19(b)
because that might confuse Israeli courts into thinking that “we are different than
the United States.”188 Following that view, the Ministry’s lead representative
later wrote, in a comprehensive treatise on Israel’s Copyright Law 2007, that the
Knesset’s clear legislative intent in enacting the fair use provision was, inter alia,
to “direct the public and the courts to the extensive fair use case law that had
accumulated in the United States, and not to develop new rules in a vacuum.”189
Yet, despite their overall similarity, there are some important differences
between the Israeli and American fair use provisions. First, the Israeli statute
preserves the two-step structure of fair dealing. To qualify as fair use, a use must
satisfy both of two independent requirements: the purpose test, codified in
section 19(a), and the fairness test, codified in section 19(b).190 In its recent
ruling in Société des Produits Nestlé v. Espresso Club Ltd., the Supreme Court
reiterated that the section 19(a) is a prerequisite to fair use.191 If a use is neither
for one of the enumerated purposes nor for any purpose that has at least some
similarity to an enumerated purpose, it cannot be considered fair use and there

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Knesset, Econ. Comm., Meeting Minutes No. 128, 17th Knesset, Statement of Tamir Afori, Israeli
Ministry of Justice 14 (Dec. 12, 2006) (Isr.), https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Pages/
AllCommitteeProtocols.aspx?ItemID=182266 (click “Copyright Law, 5768-2007” to download) [hereinafter
Knesset Econ. Comm. Minutes].
186. Proposed Copyright Law, supra note 178, at 1126.
187. Knesset Econ. Comm. Minutes, supra note 185, at 21.
188. Id.
189. AFORI, supra note 173, at 208.
190. § 19, Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH 2119 (Isr.).
191. CivA 3425/17 Société des Produits Nestlé v. Espresso Club Ltd. 31 (2019) (Isr.).
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is no need to determine its fairness under section 19(b).192 By contrast, under
U.S. fair use doctrine, courts consider the purpose of use under the first factor.
Accordingly, the purpose of use is weighed together with the other factors as
part of the overall fair use analysis.193
Second, while section 19(a) provides for an open-ended list of purposes, in
contrast with the closed list of fair dealing, it is not quite as open ended as the
introductory clause to § 107. As initially drafted, section 19(a) provided that fair
use is permitted, “inter alia,” for the enumerated uses, meaning that, much like
§ 107, the enumerated uses were meant entirely as illustrative examples.194 As
enacted, however, section 19(a) provides that fair use is permitted for purposes
“such as” the enumerated uses.195 In other words, to qualify as fair use, a use
must be for a purpose that has some characteristic in common with those
enumerated in section 19(a).196 Some commentators conclude that virtually any
use could qualify has having such a purpose.197 But, at least in principle, section
19(a) imposes some limit on the types of uses that can qualify as fair use.
Third, section 19(b) lacks an explicit reference to commercial use in the
first factor. Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act provides that courts should
consider “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”198 By contrast,
section 19 of Israel’s Copyright Law 2007, defines the first factor only as “the
purpose and character of the use.”199 Nonetheless, as indicated above, the
Ministry of Justice explanatory notes, like the Supreme Court’s ruling in Geva,
state that the use’s commercial nature is to be considered in weighing the first
factor, even if commercial nature is not definitive.200 Hence, there would seem
to be little or no practical difference in effect between Israeli and U.S. fair use
with regard to commercial uses.
Finally, unlike § 107, section 19(c) of the Israeli fair use provision
authorizes a regulatory body, specifically the Minister of Justice, to “issue
regulations prescribing conditions under which a use shall be deemed a fair
use.”201 This provision aimed to reduce the uncertainty resulting from the openended nature of the fair use doctrine.202 However, Israel’s Ministry of Justice
has yet to issue any such regulations.

192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
194. AFORI, supra note 173, at 199.
195. § 19(a), Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH 2119 (Isr.).
196. By contrast, the U.S. Copyright Act provides explicitly that the term “such as” is illustrative, not
limitative. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
197. See, e.g., AFORI, supra note 173, at 199 (stating that it is difficult to conceive of a purpose that would
be so different than those enumerated such that it could not meet the “such as” requirement).
198. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
199. § 19(b)(1), Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH 2119 (Isr.).
200. Proposed Copyright Law, supra note 178, at 1126.
201. § 19(c), Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH 2119 (Isr.).
202. See AFORI, supra note 173, at 217–18.
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C. U.S. COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY OPPOSITION TO ISRAEL’S ENACTMENT OF
FAIR USE
The IIPA actively opposed Israel’s transition from fair dealing to fair
use.203 The IIPA acknowledged that Israel’s proposed fair use provision,
including the four factors set out in section 19(b), closely tracked that of the
United States.204 But as it has in other countries, the copyright industry trade
association contrasted the newness of the proposed fair use provision in Israel
with the United States, where “many years of jurisprudence have
provided . . . considerable clarity on the boundaries of ‘fair use.’”205
Accordingly, the IIPA asserted:
There is a significant risk that in Israel the adoption of these factors at this
time might be viewed by the community as a free ticket to copy. This would
have disastrous consequences, and thus we urge the Israeli government to reexamine the introduction of these factors, rather than relying on Section 19(a),
which sets out the long-established “fair dealing” principle, followed by
specific exceptions dealing with certain special cases.206

If Israel nevertheless replaced fair dealing with fair use, the IIPA insisted,
section 19(b)(1) must be amended expressly to include the phrase “whether the
use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes.”207 The
copyright industry trade association was evidently not content to rely on the
Ministry of Justice’s explanatory notes and Israeli case law for ensuring that a
use’s commercial nature would weigh against a finding of fair use.
The IIPA also contended that:
it is essential that the law implement expressly the well established Berne
‘three-part test’ (incorporated into TRIPS) . . . . In other words, it should be
codified in Section 18 that no exception in Israel’s law (whether fair dealing,
‘fair use,’ or a specific exception) may be applied [in any way that does not
meet the three-step test].208

Finally, subsequently to Israel’s enactment of fair use, the IIPA expressed
concern over section 19(c)’s authorization of the Ministry of Justice to issue
regulations clarifying fair use. As the IIPA stated: “Fair use is a case-by-case
fact-based inquiry. This discretion seemingly without standard on the part of the
Minister potentially opens the door for even broader exceptions to be introduced

203. See Knesset Econ. Comm. Minutes, supra note 185, at 25 (Statement of Tamir Afori, Ministry of
Justice Representative) (confirming that the IIPA had filed comments with Ministry opposing the transition from
a closed list of permitted uses under fair dealing to an open list under fair use).
204. INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., supra note 135, at 70.
205. Id. at 71.
206. Id. (citation omitted).
207. Id. Ironically, the phrase distinguishing commercial from non-profit educational uses was added to
§ 107 to accord favorable fair use treatment to the latter, at the insistence of educators who had unsuccessfully
lobbied for a blanket exception for all copying done for nonprofit educational purposes. See Samuelson, supra
note 65, at 23–24.
208. INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., supra note 135, at 70.
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in Israel. IIPA seeks clarification as to what the possible checks are to this
seemingly unlimited discretion.”209
The State of Israel responded to the copyright industry objections in a
statement it submitted to the United States Trade Representative.210 It stressed
the close similarity between the Israeli and U.S. fair use provisions, proclaiming,
indeed, that section 19 is “virtually identical” to § 107.211 With respect to
copyright industry concerns about the absence of judicial precedent on fair use
in Israel, the State of Israel provided assurance that Israeli case law would draw
upon that of the United States: “A body of case law interpretation of section 19
will develop and no doubt American case law will provide persuasive precedent
on this point, as American case law often does in Israeli copyright law in
general.”212
The State of Israel also highlighted the inconsistency in the IIPA’s
insistence that Israel’s copyright statute codify the three-step test. Its response
asserts:
Neither Berne, nor TRIPS, requires that the exact language of a treaty general
principle be copied verbatim into national legislation. Indeed, if that were the
case then the IIPA would also have to claim that Section 107 “Fair Use” of
the U.S. Copyright Act is in violation of Berne Article 9(2).213

Finally, Israel deflected the IIPA’s objection to possible fair use regulation
by Israel’s Ministry of Justice: “To the extent that regulations can be
promulgated under the new section 19 with regard to specifying fair uses, such
regulations are always subordinate to the primary legislation and can not
contradict it.”214

IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ISRAELI AND U.S. FAIR USE CASE LAW
From the vantage point of over a decade since Israel’s enactment of fair
use took effect, we can now begin to assess empirically the U.S. copyright
industry’s principal objections to Israel’s adoption of fair use. In this Part, we
report the results of our comprehensive study of Israeli and U.S. fair use case
law.
We reviewed all reported fair use rulings issued by Israeli courts during the
first decade in which Israel’s statutory fair use provision, section 19 of Israel’s
Copyright Law 2007, was in effect. That period extends from May 19, 2008 to
May 18, 2018. During that decade, Israeli courts ruled on whether the
defendant’s use qualified as fair use in a total of fifty-five reported rulings. Of
209. INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., supra note 133, at 208.
210. 2009 Submission of the Government of Israel to the United States Trade Representative with Respect
to the 2009 “Special 301 Review” (Mar. 2009), https://www.justice.gov.il/Units/YeutzVehakika/
NosimMishpatim/Global/2009special301submission.pdf.
211. Id. at 13.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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these, thirty-four rulings were issued by Magistrate Courts, eighteen by District
Courts, and three by the Supreme Court.215 Of the lower court rulings, one was
upheld on appeal and one was reversed.216 For ease of reference, we label this
study our “Israel Study.”
Throughout, we compare the results of our Israel Study with empirical
studies of U.S. fair use case law, including a parallel study we conducted of U.S.
fair use case law during the same ten-year period as the Israel Study. That
parallel study of U.S. fair use case law includes 185 reported rulings, of which
157 were by district courts, 28 were by appellate courts, and none were by the
Supreme Court. For ease of reference, we label our parallel study of U.S. fair
use case law, our “U.S. Study.”
We present our results in comparison with U.S. fair use case law to provide
a baseline for assessing whether the primary concern raised by the U.S.
copyright industries in opposition to Israel’s enactment of fair use has been
realized in practice. Have Israeli courts lacking familiarity with the “carefullyhoned jurisprudence” of U.S. fair use doctrine interpreted fair use in a loose
manner that severely undermines copyright protection in comparison with the
experience with fair use in the U.S.?217 We also test Israel’s response that U.S.
copyright industry objections are fundamentally misguided because Israeli
courts will, no doubt, look to U.S. precedent to guide their interpretation of
section 19, which, after all, is closely modeled on § 107.
A. METHODOLOGY
Before we present the results of our studies, a caveat is in order. Our studies
look to the outcomes and express rationales that courts present in reported
judicial rulings. As such, they are subject to the same limitations as
commentators have detailed with respect to similar empirical studies.218
Most importantly, while reported judicial rulings have great importance for
understanding fair use, they capture only the cases that were of sufficient
uncertainty of outcome and of sufficient monetary value that both parties saw fit
215. Magistrate Courts are trial courts that have jurisdiction over civil claims for less than 2.5 million shekels
(the equivalent of roughly $715,000). District Courts are both trial courts that have jurisdiction over larger claims
and courts of appeal for cases that originate in Magistrate Court. Appeals from District Courts are directly to the
Supreme Court. See The Judiciary: The Court System, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS., https://mfa.gov.il/
mfa/aboutisrael/state/democracy/pages/the%20judiciary-%20the%20court%20system.aspx (last visited Apr.
19, 2021).
216. To better assess Israeli courts’ understandings of fair use, we count all rulings, including the ruling that
was reversed on appeal.
217. In its 2009 Special 301 Report recommending that Israel remain on the USTR Watch List for possible
trade sanctions, the IIPA stated:
While IIPA would by no means object to the adoption of fair use as understood in the U.S., and as
interpreted through decades of jurisprudence, Israel does not have that carefully-honed
jurisprudence, and the adoption of the “fair use” standards without it risks creating gaps in
protection that would not be justified in countries having a “fair use” tradition.
INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALL., supra note 133, at 208.
218. See Netanel, supra note 43, at 731–34 (surveying the literature); see also Sag, supra note 47, at 83.
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to litigate through at least one judicial ruling.219 Nor does a study of reported
cases directly reflect the myriad decisions related to copyright that are not related
to litigation, including those that inform licensing and unilateral decisions about
when to copy or refrain from copying existing works.220
In addition, our empirical studies do not attempt to dive under the hood to
explore what unexpressed considerations, biases, factors, and result-oriented
jurisprudence might actually be driving judicial rulings on fair use. To attempt
to do so would have introduced undue speculation, distortions, inconsistencies,
and unreliability into scoring the rulings. As such, one might say that our studies
report what courts say they are doing, not necessarily what courts are actually
doing.
Nonetheless, our statistical analysis in the Israel Study does show that
various factors external to those that Israeli courts expressly identify in their fair
use jurisprudence have no statistically significant correlation with the finding of
fair use. These include the types of litigants (individuals, corporations, nonprofits, or government agencies), the types of works alleged to have been
infringed (such as photographs, audiovisual works, or literary works), and the
types of works created by the alleged infringers. We are thus reasonably
confident that our results do not reflect idiosyncrasies in the mix of litigants or
categories of works at issue during the period of our study. Rather, the doctrinal
factors that Israeli courts have cited as part of their fair use analysis and that do
have a statistically significant correlation with fair use outcomes appear to drive
the courts’ fair use rulings and to form the foundations of Israel’s fair use
doctrine during the period of our study.
B. RESULTS
1.

Case Outcomes on Fair Use

During the ten-year period of our study, Israeli courts were significantly
less likely than their U.S. counterparts to rule that a use qualifies as fair use. Of
the fifty-five rulings in our Israel Study, the court determined that the allegedly
infringing use failed to qualify as a fair use in a substantial majority of the cases.
The court rejected the alleged infringer’s fair use defense in thirty-nine cases,
just over 70% of the total. The court ruled that the use was a fair use in just
sixteen cases, slightly less than 30% of the total. Be that as it may, during the
first decade in which Israel’s statutory fair use provision was in effect, fair use
claimants had a somewhat better rate of success than had fair dealing claimants

219. The pioneer study of reported case selection biases is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL. STUD. 1 (1984); see also Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our
Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265 (2002).
220. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Copyright’s Topography: An Empirical Study of
Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1981, 1985 (2014).
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prior to effective date of the Copyright Law 2007, although the difference is not
statistically significant.221
By contrast, a plurality of the 185 rulings in our U.S. Study favored the
alleged infringer on the issue of fair use. In the United States, the court rejected
fair use in seventy-five cases, or 40.5% of the total, and ruled that the use was a
fair use in ninety cases, or 48.6% of the total. Of the remaining cases, the court
ruled that further proceedings were needed to determine outstanding questions
of fact in eighteen cases (less than 10% of the total), and issued a mixed result,
partly favoring the plaintiff and partly the defendant, in two cases.
FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE OF RULINGS FINDING FAIR USE IN U.S. AND ISRAEL
Percentage of Rulings Finding Fair Use
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What could explain this dramatic difference in fair use outcomes between
the two countries? It might stem in part from variations in statutory language. In
particular, the Israeli provision retains something of fair dealing’s two-part
structure, providing that to qualify as fair use, a use must satisfy both the purpose
requirement and the fairness requirement. We return to that possible explanation
below.222
Another possible explanation is that Israeli courts have taken substantive
positions that have contributed to less friendly outcomes for the fair use defense
than under U.S. fair use doctrine, at least during the ten-year period of our study.
To shed light on that explanation, we reviewed each of the fifty-five Israeli
rulings on fair use. Somewhat speculatively, we assessed whether, in our

221. Israeli courts rejected the fair dealing defense in 84% of the 32 rulings that addressed the defense prior
to May 2008. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Users’ Rights, in AUTHORING RIGHTS: READING THE ISRAELI COPYRIGHT
ACT, 2007, at 327, 354–57 (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach eds., 2009) (Hebrew) (noting that during that
period Israel courts fully accepted the fair dealing defense in just four cases and partly accepted the defense in
one other case).
222. See infra notes 308–309 and accompanying text.
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considered judgment, a U.S. court would have ruled the same as the Israeli court
if the same facts were before the U.S. court.
In our view, U.S. courts would have come to the same conclusion as the
Israeli courts in the vast majority of cases. Among the outliers, an Israeli lower
court ruled that the defendant’s internet streaming of television broadcasts of
soccer games qualified as fair use, noting that the defendant served the public
interest in viewing sports matches that would otherwise not be generally
available in Israel and did so without charging viewers or selling advertising.223
It is highly unlikely that a U.S. court would have accepted such a fair use defense
and, indeed, the Israeli Supreme Court subsequently reversed the lower court
ruling on appeal.224
On the other side of the coin, a number of Israeli rulings rejected fair use
when defendants used iconic, decades-old news photographs to present
historical documentation of significant events in Israel’s history or to
background news coverage of breaking developments, largely because the
defendants had failed to give authorship credit to the photographer.225 By
contrast, the use of photographs and graphic images as historical artifacts and
documentation has generally (although not universally) been held to be fair use
in the United States.226 Moreover, as discussed below, the failure to give
authorship credit is a non-issue in U.S. fair use cases.227
223. The Football Association Premier League v. Ploni, Case No. 1636/08, Motion 11646/08, (District Ct.,
Tel Aviv, 2009) (Isr.).
224. CivA 8485/08, FA Premier League v. Israel Sports Betting Council (2010) (Isr.).
225. See, e.g., Ephraim Sharir v. Teetell Arutzei Tikshoret, Case No. 4384-12-13 (Magistrate Ct., Beit
She’an, 2014) (Isr.) (use of news photo as it appeared in Lebanese press in story about Lebanese ridicule of
Israeli leaders); Shmuel Rakhmani v. Israeli Basketball Super League Administration Ltd., Case No. 44159-08
(Magistrate Ct., Tel Aviv, 2010) (Isr.) (use of news photo in League’s exhibition commemorating sixty years of
Israeli basketball history); Shmuel Rakhmani v. Israel News Corporation Ltd., Case No. 7036-09 (Magistrate
Ct., Jerusalem, 2011) (Isr.) (use of news photo in documentary about significant events in Israel’s history). But
see Danon Image Communication v. Shelly Yachimovich, Case No. 57588-05-12 (1), (Magistrate Ct., Tel Aviv,
2014) (Isr.) (posting a photograph of a politician, in an article featuring an interview with her, constitutes fair
use); Joseph Tauber v. Israel 10 - News Channel Broadcasting Ltd., Case No. 18924-07-13 (District Ct., Haifa,
2013) (Isr.) (displaying a copyrighted photograph of a legendary Israeli singer, in a news report regarding an
exhibition in her honor, is fair use).
226. The classic case is Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), holding
that copying the iconic Zapruder photographs of the John F. Kennedy assassination to provide the public with
information on that major historical event was fair use. See Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932,
944–45 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that NFL’s copying of graphic image of football team’s former logo in
documentary video and football team’s public display of former logo in exhibition featuring memorabilia from
the team’s history are fair use); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–10 (2d Cir.
2006) (holding that use of concert poster art to illustrate a historical biography of rock band is fair use); Núñez
v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that republication of photographs
taken for a modeling portfolio in a newspaper was transformative because the photos served to inform, as well
as entertain); Philpot v. Media Rsch. Ctr. Inc., 279 F. Supp. 3d 708, 722 (E.D. Va. 2018) (holding that
defendant’s use of plaintiff’s photographs of famous musicians to accompany online articles about those
musicians’ political views constitutes fair use). But see Monge v. Maya Mags., Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1176 (9th
Cir. 2012) (holding that a celebrity gossip magazine’s publication of previously unpublished photographs of
plaintiff’s clandestine wedding is not fair use).
227. See infra text accompanying notes 308–309.
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It is also possible that the sharp disparity in fair use outcomes reflects some
difference in litigation rules and practice between the two countries. Factors such
as litigation costs, the availability and size of statutory damage awards, awards
of attorney’s fees and costs to prevailing parties, judicial power and propensity
to dispose of cases and discrete issues in cases prior to trial, judicial
encouragement of pretrial settlement, the ready availability of copyright
licensing (including through collective rights management organizations), and
the presence of repeat players in the field can impact the mix of copyright cases
and case outcomes.228 In that regard, during the ten-year period of our study,
Israeli courts issued a proportionately large number of fair use rulings compared
to U.S. courts, considering that Israel is a far smaller country than the United
States. We suspect that the high cost of litigation, coupled with the taxing nature
of discovery practice, in the United States operates to diminish the number of
potential copyright cases that are litigated to a reported judicial ruling.229 Over
60% of the cases in our Israel Study were brought in Magistrate Court, where
civil claims may not exceed the rough equivalent of $715,000. It would often
not be worth litigating claims of that size in the United States.230 In any event,
the possible extent, if any, of litigant selection effects arising from such factors
and their possible impact on fair use case outcomes are beyond the scope of our
study.231
228. For example, the scholarly literature has shown that under certain conditions, the English Rule, under
which the losing party pays the winning party’s attorney’s fees, engenders a mix of litigated cases having a
higher possibility that plaintiffs will prevail than under the American Rule, under which no attorney fee shifting
occurs. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 139, 140–42 (1984). However, we doubt that result obtains in our study. Israel follows the English Rule,
but, for all intents and purposes, so does the United States in copyright cases, even if U.S. courts have stopped
short of formally adopting the English Rule. See Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79
U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 341 (2012) (noting that attorney’s fees are awarded to prevailing copyright owners “as a
matter of course despite being nominally discretionary”); Jeffrey Edward Barnes, Comment, Attorney’s Fee
Awards in Federal Copyright Litigation After Fogerty v. Fantasy: Defendants are Winning Fees More Often,
But the New Standard Still Favors Prevailing Plaintiffs, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1381, 1390 (2000) (presenting
empirical study finding that U.S. courts granted motions for attorney’s fees to prevailing copyright infringement
plaintiffs in 89% of the cases and to prevailing copyright infringement defendants in 61% of the cases).
229. According to one empirical study of a representative sample of U.S. copyright litigation, more than
85% of copyright infringement lawsuits are terminated voluntarily by one or both parties, or by default judgment
without a substantive ruling by the court. Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 220, at 2001–02.
230. As of 2011, the average cost of litigating a copyright infringement case through trial, for either plaintiff
or defendant—and excluding judgment and awards—was estimated to range from $384,000 to $2 million. See
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Essay, Copyright Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2277, 2280 (2013)
(citing American Intellectual Property Law Association survey).
231. We are also aware of the Priest-Klein hypothesis that outcomes in civil litigation should generally
approximate 50% since parties will settle all but the most uncertain cases. See Priest & Klein, supra note 219,
at 5–6. As Priest and Klein recognize, however, there are various exceptions to that hypothesis. See Netanel,
supra note 43, at 753–54 (discussing Priest-Klein hypothesis and its exceptions); see also Liu, supra note 52, at
167 n.19; John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness and
Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 670–71 (2016). In particular, potential fair use outcomes were probably subject
to considerable uncertainty during the period of our study, during the first decade in which Israel’s statutory fair
use provision was in effect and during a longer period, extending back to the mid-1990s, in which U.S. fair use
doctrine was in flux.
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Finally, in comparing U.S. and Israeli courts’ acceptance of the fair use
defense, it is important to reiterate that fair use outcomes in the United States
have shifted over time. U.S. courts became far more receptive to fair use
defenses after the transformative use approach came to dominate fair use case
law, roughly following the Second Circuit’s embrace of the approach in the
Grateful Dead concert posters case in 2006.232 In his study of fair use case law
from 1978 through 2005, Barton Beebe found that defendants’ fair use win rate
for district court rulings that were not reversed on appeal was only 32.1%.233 But
as a later study showed, that fair use win rate rose dramatically between 2006
and 2010 to 58.3%.234 Moreover, recent years have seen a possible retreat from
U.S. courts’ defendant-friendly approach to fair use. Our U.S. Study showed a
statistically significant turn away from accepting the fair use defense during the
last two years of our study, as U.S. courts became less willing to find that the
defendant’s use is transformative.235 From May 25, 2014 through May 24, 2016,
U.S. courts ruled that the use was fair use in 64.1% of the cases. But from May
25, 2016 through May 24, 2018, U.S. courts ruled that the use was fair use in
only 35.5% of the cases.236 Hence, while fair use win rates in Israel were
substantially lower than in the United States during the full ten-year period of
our study, win rates in Israel are much closer to those in the United States during
the last two years of our study and during the period prior to U.S. courts’ decided
embrace of the transformative use approach in 2006.
At bottom, while Israeli courts ruled against fair use at a markedly higher
rate than did U.S. courts during the period of our study, we do not want to
overstate the significance of that data point. On one hand, it is, indeed, quite
clear that Israel’s enactment of fair use has not resulted in a “free ticket to copy”
with “disastrous consequences” for copyright owners, the U.S. copyright
industries’ dire predictions notwithstanding.237 But the extent, if any, to which
Israel’s markedly less fair-use friendly outcomes truly reflects a significantly
more restrictive substantive understanding of fair use among Israeli courts than
under U.S. fair use doctrine requires further study. Moreover, to compare the
two is, necessarily, to aim at a moving target as U.S. and Israeli fair use doctrine
evolve over time.
232. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
233. Beebe’s data was limited to unreversed district court rulings on motions for preliminary injunctions,
bench trials, and crossed motions for summary judgment. He considered just crossed motions for summary
judgment because courts are generally more likely to publish an opinion granting summary judgment than
denying it. As a result, if cases where only one party moves for summary judgment are included, the results will
be skewed by whether plaintiffs or defendants file more such motions. Beebe, supra note 44, at 576–78.
234. Netanel, supra note 43, at 755 (showing win rates for unreversed district court rulings on motions for
preliminary injunctions, bench trials, and crossed motions for summary judgment).
235. Our U.S. Study showed that courts found the defendant’s use to be transformative in 63% of the cases
during the two-year period, May 25, 2015 through May 24, 2016, but in only 43% of the cases during the final
two-year period of our study.
236. The Pearson chi-square measure of statistical significance for the shift in fair use outcome from the
first of those two-year periods to the second is 0.041.
237. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (quoting the IIPA’s dire prediction).
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Influence of U.S. Precedent

Judicial citations to rulings of other courts are a commonly used metric for
the influence of those other courts. For example, Barton Beebe concluded, based
on case citations, that fair use rulings from courts of the Second and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeal exerted an overwhelming influence on fair use rulings
outside those circuits during the period of his empirical fair use case law
study.238
Applying the metric of case citations to our study leads to what, at first
glance, is a startling result. Contrary to Israel’s assertion that Israeli courts would
look to U.S. fair use precedent for guidance regarding how to interpret and apply
Israel’s new fair use provision, rulings of U.S. courts seem to have had virtually
no direct influence on Israeli fair use case law during the first ten years in which
Israel’s fair use statute was in effect. Only two Israeli fair use rulings cited any
U.S. fair use precedent at all. Both cases cited the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.239 Israeli courts made no mention of either
of two other seminal U.S Supreme Court rulings on fair use, Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios240 and Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises.241 No less
dramatically, only two Israeli cases made any reference to § 107 of the U.S.
Copyright Act. Evidently, in the vast majority of cases, Israeli courts saw no
reason to cite the U.S. fair use provision from which section 19 of the Copyright
Law 2007 is derived.
Yet, despite the general dearth of case citations to U.S. fair use precedent
in our study, U.S. fair use doctrine clearly has influenced the crafting of fair use
doctrine by Israeli courts. First, as discussed above, the Israeli Supreme Court
first introduced fair use doctrine into Israeli copyright law in Geva v. Walt
Disney Co., some fourteen years before the Knesset replaced Israel’s prior fair
dealing exception with fair use in the Copyright Law 2007. Geva did cite and
rely on U.S. precedent, including Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. and
several leading lower court rulings.242 Geva’s interpretation and application of
U.S. fair use doctrine remains seminal precedent in Israeli fair use case law.
Thus, through Geva, U.S. fair use precedent has indirectly impacted Israeli fair
use case law even if Israeli courts do not generally cite the U.S. cases.
Second, the two rulings in our Israel Study that do reference U.S.
precedents were Supreme Court cases. During the period of our Israel Study,
Israel’s Supreme Court addressed fair use in four rulings. In two out of the four,
the Court made explicit reference to U.S. fair use precedents. Football
Association Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous involved a petition to unmask

238. Beebe, supra note 44, at 567–68.
239. See, e.g., CivA 9183/09 The Football Association Premier League Limited v. Anonymous 10 (2012)
(Isr.) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)).
240. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
241. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
242. CivA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 48(1) PD 251, 277–81 (1993) (Isr.).
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the identity of an anonymous user who streamed unauthorized broadcasts of
football matches owned by the English Premier League.243 Although the petition
was dismissed on procedural grounds, the Israeli Supreme Court stated that
streaming constituted copyright infringement and that fair use did not apply.244
The Court cited Campbell for the transformative use approach, and also made
extensive references to U.S. law review articles.245
In another decision, Safecom, Ltd. v. Raviv, the Israeli Supreme Court
addressed the copied drawings of a functional electric device in a patent
application submitted to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.246 The Court
explicitly stated that “the four subordinate criteria [that is, the fair use factors]
listed in section 19(b) of the New Law are based on the subordinate criteria that
have been laid down in the American Copyright Act [see: 17 USC § 107].”247
The Court further cited empirical research on U.S. fair use doctrine
demonstrating that
although the fourth subordinate criterion—the effect on the potential market—
is most often mentioned as the decisive factor regarding the fairness of use,
the first subordinate criterion—the purpose and nature of the use—does in fact
have the most marked effect on the decision, the most influential factors being
the commerciality and transformativeness of the use.248

Citing the decision in Football Association Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous,
the Court held that these two factors were also the most influential under Israeli
law.249
Finally, in Société des Produits Nestlé v. Espresso Club Ltd., decided just
after the ten-year period of our study, the Israeli Supreme Court relied heavily
on Campbell to hold that the defendant’s parodic use was a transformative use
and fair use.250 The Court repeatedly cited other U.S. fair use precedent as well.
At bottom, therefore, U.S. fair use precedent has probably influenced Israeli fair
use jurisprudence to a considerably greater extent than what might appear from
overall case citations. Indeed, the dearth of lower court citations to U.S.
precedent might reflect the economics of litigation more than a decided lack of
interest in U.S. precedent. Israeli courts will typically not look to foreign law
unless the parties cite it, and lawyers are unlikely to devote resources to
uncovering foreign law unless the case is of sufficiently high value to warrant
that investment.
243. CivA 9183/09 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous (2012) (Isr.). For a translation of the
district court decision, see CivC (TA) 1636/08 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous, Nevo Legal
Database (Sept. 2, 2009) (Isr.), http://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/mechozi/me-08-1636-11.doc.
244. Id. at 2.
245. Id. at 12.
246. CivA 7996/11 Safecom, Ltd. v. Raviv (Oct. 10, 2013) (Isr.), http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/
files/upload/opinions/Safecom%2C%20Ltd.%20v.%20Raviv.pdf.
247. Id. at 19–20.
248. Id. at 20 (first citing Beebe, supra note 44; and then citing Netanel, supra note 43).
249. Id. at 20.
250. CivA 3425/17 Société des Produits Nestlé v. Espresso Club Ltd. 38 (2019) (Isr.).
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Role of the Four Fair Use Factors in Fair Use Analysis

U.S. courts almost invariably apply each of the four statutory fair use
factors as part of their fair use analysis. Indeed, in Campbell, the Supreme Court
mandated consideration of all four factors. As the Court stated: “Nor may the
four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be
explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of
copyright.”251
Israel’s fair use provision likewise states that courts must consider all four
of the factors. Section 19 provides: “In determining whether a use made of a
work is fair within the meaning of this section the factors to be considered shall
include, inter alia, all of the following: [the four factors].”252 Nonetheless, in its
2012 ruling in Football Association Premier League, the Israeli Supreme Court
held that “[t]hese are not essential or cumulative factors but a non-exhaustive
list of parameters that might indicate the fairness of a particular use that is made
of a protected work.”253
In line with the Israeli Supreme Court’s statement, and despite the statutory
requirement that “all” factors be weighed, Israeli courts seem to view the four
factors as suggested guidelines rather than a checklist of items that must be
expressly addressed in fair use analysis. Indeed, in almost 40% of the rulings in
our Israel Study, the court did not expressly apply any of the four fair use factors
to the facts of the case before it in determining whether the defendant’s copying
qualified as fair use.

251. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
252. § 19, Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH 2119 (Isr.).
253. CivA 7996/11 Safecom, Ltd. v. Raviv (Oct. 10, 2013) (Isr.), http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/
sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Safecom%2C%20Ltd.%20v.%20Raviv.pdf (quoting CivA 9183/09 Football
Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous (2012) (Isr.)).
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FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF ISRAELI RULINGS APPLYING ANY OF FACTORS

Percentage of Israeli Rulings that Expressly Apply
Any of the Four Factors
Apply at least
one factor

38.2%

Apply no factors

61.8%

Further, while 51% of the Israeli rulings expressly apply the first factor—
the purpose and character of the use—significantly less than half apply any of
the other three factors. Only 20% apply factor two—the character of the work
used. Only 41.8% apply factor three—the scope of the use—quantitatively and
qualitatively, in relation to the work as a whole. And only 32.7% of Israeli fair
use rulings apply factor four—harm to the copyright holder’s market.
FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF ISRAELI RULINGS APPLYING EACH FACTOR
Percentage of Israeli Rulings that Expressly Apply Each Factor
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4. Weighing the Four Factors
In the cases in which Israeli courts do apply one or more of the four
statutory fair use factors, they, like their U.S. counterparts, typically determine
whether that factor weighs in favor of or against fair use. In the instances in
which Israeli courts determine that a statutory factor weighs for or against fair
use, that determination lines up almost universally with the fair use outcome in
the case. For example, during the ten-year period of our Israel Study, Israeli
courts expressly found that the first factor weighed against fair use in 27.2% of
the cases. They rejected the fair use defense in every one of those cases. Israeli
courts expressly found that the first factor weighed in favor of fair use in 26.3%
of the cases. They ruled that the alleged infringer had made fair use of the
plaintiff’s work in every one of those cases. When Israeli courts expressly found
that factors two, three, or four either favored or disfavored fair use, that finding
also substantially lined up with the court’s ruling on fair use overall, albeit by
slightly less than a 100% correlation.
Notwithstanding the strong correlation between Israeli courts’ findings on
the statutory factors and fair use outcomes, only factor one appears to have much
valence in explaining fair use outcomes in Israel. Our Israel Study shows a
statistically significant correlation between an Israeli court’s determination on
factor one and the court’s ruling on the overall issue of fair use.254 And, as noted
above, Israeli courts expressly applied the first factor in slightly more than half
the cases during the ten-year period of our study. Of the other factors, only factor
two has a statistically significant correlation with overall fair use outcomes. But
since only 20% of the cases even mention factor two, it is unlikely that judicial
determinations of factor two have much effect on fair use outcomes overall.255
In the United States, factor one also has the strongest correlation with fair
use outcome. However, unlike in Israel, the correlation between factor four and
fair use outcome is statistically significant as well.256 U.S. fair use jurisprudence
also differs from Israeli case law in which sub-factors of factor one are most
strongly correlated with fair use outcome and thus that seem to drive judicial
rulings on fair use. In the United States, courts have identified three sub-factors
pertaining to the purpose and the character of the defendant’s use.257 These are
whether (1) the use is transformative, (2) the use is commercial, and (3) the
defendant used the copyrighted work in good faith. In the United States,
transformative use appears to play a significantly larger role in determining fair

254. The Fisher’s exact test measure of statistical significance for the correlation of a judicial finding that
factor one weighs against fair use with a fair use outcome that rejects fair use is two-sided p<=0.0025. The
Fisher’s exact test measure of statistical significance for the correlation of a judicial finding that factor one favors
fair use with a fair use outcome that finds fair use is two-sided p<=0.0001. The Fisher exact test is used to
measure statistical significance where the size of the data sample is sufficiently small so that Chi-Square might
not be a valid test.
255. We rely only on bivariate correlations because logistic regression analysis is not suited to our study.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.6.
256. Liu, supra note 52, at 184–85, 198.
257. Id. at 185.
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use outcomes than do the other two sub-factors. Indeed, Jairui Liu’s study finds
that when courts found factor one to favor fair use, only transformative use was
statistically significant among the sub-factors.258
In Israel, as further elucidated below, although the Israeli Supreme Court
twice referred to transformative use as part of the fair use analysis, the lower
courts almost entirely ignored the concept of transformative use during the
period of our study.259 Rather the factors of (1) the commercial character of the
allegedly infringing use and (2) whether the defendant gave authorship credit to
the creator of the copied work, a factor that has hardly any role at all in U.S. fair
use jurisprudence, have the strongest correlation with fair use outcome.260 In our
Israel Study, the defendant’s good or bad faith also has a statistically significant
correlation with fair use outcome when measured in a bivariate analysis.
Of further note, although factor one now has the strongest correlation with
fair use outcomes in the United States, factor four had the strongest correlation
during the period before the transformative use approach came to dominate U.S.
fair use case law. Indeed, in his empirical study of fair use case law from 1978
to 2005, Barton Beebe reported a near perfect correlation between judicial
findings on factor four and fair use outcomes.261 That result comported with the
U.S. Supreme Court dictum in Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, stating that the fourth factor “is undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use.”262 However, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., decided in 1994, some nine years after Harper & Row, the Supreme Court
flatly contradicted the Harper & Row dictum.263 The Campbell Court
underscored that courts are to consider all four statutory factors, without any
single factor being the most important.264 Further, the first factor, in particular
the question of whether the defendant’s use is transformative, has now eclipsed
the fourth factor in importance and degree of correlation with fair use
outcomes.265 Nonetheless, lower courts in the United States continue to cite the
Harper & Row dictum that the fourth factor is the single most important. Onefourth of the rulings in our U.S. Study cited the dictum.
Whatever the continuing force of the Harper & Row dictum in the United
States, it has had negligible influence in Israel. That is not surprising. After all,
less than one-third of the rulings in our Israel Study apply factor four and no
258. Id.
259. See infra text accompanying notes 281–290.
260. We refer to the commercial character of the use and whether the defendant gave authorship credit as
“factors” rather than “sub-factors” because Israeli courts treat authorship credit and, sometimes, commercial
character, as independent factors rather than subsuming them within the first statutory factor or any other
statutory factor.
261. Beebe, supra note 44, at 617.
262. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
263. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (“[A]ll [four factors] are to be explored,
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”).
264. Id.
265. See Asay et al., supra note 50, at 944–46 (reporting regression analysis that shows that the question of
transformative use is paramount in fair use cases and has even come to exert a strong influence on factor four
analysis).
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Israeli ruling has cited Harper & Row. Only one Israeli ruling in our data set
stated that factor four is the most important. Four rulings stated expressly that
factor four is not the most important and that all the factors should be considered
equally. Forty-nine rulings, amounting to 89.1% of the rulings in our Israel
Study, made no reference at all to the relative importance of factor four.
Finally, in what may mark a departure from American fair use
jurisprudence, the Israeli Supreme Court in Société des Produits Nestlé v.
Espresso Club Ltd. has recently put forth an original conceptual framework for
the four factors analysis. Copyright law, the court held, aims to encourage the
creation of works for the purpose of enriching the public domain.266 To that end,
the Court stated, fair use serves to limit copyright, to ensure that copyright is
appropriately balanced to achieve its goals, and to ensure it does not unduly
constrain public access to works without justification.267
Within that framework, the Israeli Supreme Court classified the four
factors within three broad considerations based on copyright law’s normative
foundation.268 In so doing, the Court characterized the four factors as tests to
assist the court in applying these considerations in particular circumstances. The
first consideration explores the extent to which the allegedly infringing work
promotes socially valuable objectives, including that of encouraging creation.269
This consideration is reflected in factor one (the purpose and character of use)
and factor two (the nature of the protected work).270 The second consideration is
the extent by which the allegedly infringing use impairs the copyright holder’s
incentives, by compromising his control over the use of his work and its
economic exploitation.271 This consideration is reflected in factor four (effect on
the value of work and its potential market) and factor three (the scope of use).272
The third consideration is proportionality.273 It explores the extent to which the
actual use of the original work in the allegedly infringing copy serves the general
purpose of the allegedly infringing work. Factor three (the scope of use) and
factor one (the purpose and character of use) reflect this consideration.
Notwithstanding its characterization of the four factors as merely sub-tests
to assist the court in applying those three considerations as needed, the Israeli
Supreme Court in Nestlé nevertheless proceeded to carefully analyze each of the
factors. It remains to be seen whether this new conceptual framework for the
four factors will affect their relative weight in determining fair use outcomes,
and how this framework will affect the overall analysis of fair use cases.

266. CivA 3425/17 Société des Produits Nestlé v. Espresso Club Ltd. 31 (2019) (Isr.).
267. Id. at 32.
268. Id. at 34.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. The Israeli Supreme Court noted that there might be a tension between these two considerations, for
instance, when a work promotes an important social goal but may cause economic harm to the rights holder. Id.
273. Id. at 34–35.
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Transformative Use

Within the last two decades, the transformative use approach has come to
completely dominate U.S. fair use jurisprudence. As we have noted, in his recent
exhaustive empirical study of transformative use in U.S. copyright law from the
Copyright Act of 1976 through 2016, Liu reports that during the final decade of
his study nearly 90% of U.S. fair use rulings addressed whether the allegedly
infringing use is transformative.274 Liu’s study also shows significant
correlations between fair use outcomes and judicial findings regarding whether
a use is transformative.275 Finally, as Liu demonstrates, a finding that a use is
transformative profoundly impacts judicial analysis of fair use factors one, three,
and four.276
Not surprisingly, our U.S. Study comports with Liu’s findings. During the
period of our study, courts explicitly addressed whether the defendant’s use was
transformative in 82.7% of the cases. Further, in an additional 14.2% of the
cases, courts applied the transformative use approach by expressly addressing
the key definition of what constitutes a “transformative use,” whether the
defendant’s expressive purpose differs from that of the plaintiff, even if the court
did not expressly use the word “transformative.” Together, these amount to
almost 97% of the cases in our U.S. Study. And, notably, although courts during
the final two years of our U.S. Study were less likely to find the defendant’s use
to qualify as transformative than previously, they continued to consider whether
the use is transformative in almost every case.
By comparison, the transformative use approach had relatively marginal
influence in Israeli fair use case law during the first ten years in which Israel’s
Copyright Law 2007 took effect. Nonetheless, as we presently explain, the issue
of whether the defendant’s use is transformative may have had greater impact
than appears at first glance. It also seems likely to loom larger in Israeli fair use
doctrine in the years ahead.
During the period of our empirical study, only eight Israeli rulings, 14.5%
of the total, mentioned the word “transformative.” And, of those, only six
rulings, 10.9% of the total, expressly found whether or not the allegedly
infringing use in question was transformative. Likewise, very few rulings
considered or gave any weight to whether the alleged infringer’s expressive
purpose differed from that of the author of the copied work. Only two cases
found that the alleged infringer had a different expressive purpose and that this
fact weighed in favor of fair use.
However, in those few instances in which Israeli courts did determine
whether the use in question was transformative, the findings correlated 100%
with fair use outcomes.277 In all three of the cases in which the court held that
274. Liu, supra note 52, at 177.
275. Id. at 180 (finding that outcome on issue of transformative use correlates without fair use outcome over
94% of the time).
276. Id. at 185 (factor two), 194–95 (factor three), and 198–99 (factor four).
277. In line with that 100% correlation in those few cases in which Israeli courts did rule on whether the use
is transformative, there was a statistically significant correlation overall between the Israeli courts’ finding on
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the use was transformative, it ruled that the use was fair use. In all three in which
the court held that the use was not transformative, it ruled against fair use. Thus,
at least within the very small set of cases in which Israeli courts did determine
whether the allegedly infringing use was transformative, Israeli jurisprudence
aligned with the transformative use approach that dominates U.S. fair use
doctrine. In both countries, a finding of whether the defendant’s use is
transformative heavily correlates with fair use outcome.
In addition, Israel’s Supreme Court has been considerably more receptive
to U.S. transformative use doctrine than its lower courts. Out of the handful of
cases in our Israel Study that expressly addressed transformative use, two are
Supreme Court rulings. Citing Campbell, the Israeli Supreme Court in Football
Association Premier League Ltd. opined that transformative uses are more likely
to qualify as fair use than are non-transformative uses.278 Transformative uses,
the Court stated, fulfill the purpose of the fair use exception, which is to promote
creativity and enrich the accumulated store of knowledge.279 Moreover, the
Court noted, in many cases, a transformative use neither substitutes for the
protected work nor otherwise competes with it.280 As a result, transformative
uses generally cause no economic harm to authors’ incentives to create.
Ultimately, however, the Court rejected the defendant’s fair use claim in the case
before it. In so ruling, it held that streaming an original broadcast “as is,” in a
manner that serves exactly the same purpose and aims to reach precisely the
same audience as the original does not constitute a transformative use.281
In Safecom, Ltd. v. Raviv,282 the Israeli Supreme Court alluded to the
importance of transformative use, citing American empirical studies.283 Yet,
finding against fair use, the court held that defendant’s near exact copy of the
plaintiff’s patent application drawings did not qualify as transformative use.284
As the court stated, “it does not appear that the Respondent’s use of the Safecom
drawings led to the creation of a new expression, different from the original
expression embodied in them.”285
Finally, in its recent seminal decision in Société des Produits Nestlé v.
Espresso Club Ltd., the Israeli Supreme Court fully embraced the transformative
use approach that currently dominates U.S. fair use case law.286 Nestlé, the
owner of the successful global brand Nespresso, sued a local Israeli coffee
transformative use and fair use outcomes (Fisher’s exact test two-sided p<=0.0284) even though almost 90% of
the rulings did not even mention transformative use.
278. CivA 9183/09 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous 15 (2012) (Isr.).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. The Israeli Supreme Court’s holding is consistent with prevailing U.S. fair use doctrine. See, e.g.,
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have been reluctant to find fair use when
an original work is merely retransmitted in a different medium.”).
282. CivA 7996/11 Safecom, Ltd. v. Raviv (Oct. 10, 2013) (Isr.), http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/
sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Safecom%2C%20Ltd.%20v.%20Raviv.pdf.
283. Id. at 20 (first citing Beebe, supra note 44; and then citing Netanel, supra note 43).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. CivA 3425/17 Société des Produits Nestlé v. Espresso Club Ltd. (2019) (Isr.).
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company, Espresso Club, over Espresso Club’s TV commercial campaign
mocking Nespresso’s original commercials featuring the American star, George
Clooney.287
In a ruling that draws heavily on U.S. precedent and law review articles,
the Court found for the defendant, concluding that the mocking commercial
amounted to fair use.288 In so doing, the Court highlighted the significance of
transformative use as a central test of fair use considered by the courts in the
United States and in Israel.289 The importance of the transformative use test, the
Court stated, arises from its link to the purpose of copyright law: to enrich the
public domain with creative works.290 The public domain does not gain from
mere copying a work without any additional creativity, and it is therefore
difficult to justify the harm such copying may cause to the incentives of the
original author. However, when the defendant has used the original work to
create something different and new, the justification for allowing the original
author to prevent the distribution of the second work is called into question.
Citing Campbell, the Court stated that transformativeness involves an inquiry
into the extent to which the defendant’s work has a different or innovative
character compared to the original work, and whether it has some additional
layer or dimension.291
The use at issue in Nestlé was a parody, a paradigmatic transformative use.
It was clearly a work of different character, which had a different essence and
communicated a different message. Nestlé thus raises the question of whether
uses, like Google Book Search’s mass digitization of books, that involve exact
copying of the entire original work for a fundamentally different, socially
beneficial purpose might qualify as a transformative use and a fair use.292 While
Israeli courts have yet to rule on technological uses like mass digitization, lower
courts have accepted fair use claims involving exact copying for different
purposes without making any express reference to transformative use. Those
uses have included copying a chorography for the purpose of learning,293
replication of portions of a copyrighted newspaper interview on a politician’s
website,294 the posting of a copyrighted photograph on a Facebook page of an
NGO advocating animals’ rights,295 and the pulling of blog posts entries and

287. Id. at 1–2.
288. Id. at 55.
289. Id. at 43–46. With regard to the Israeli cases, the Israeli Supreme Court cited the two prior Supreme
Court rulings that had discussed transformative use: CivA 7996/11 Safecom, Ltd. v. Raviv (2013) (Isr.) and
CivA 9183/09 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous (2012) (Isr.).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 43.
292. CivA 230/12 Jonathan Brauner v. Google Inc. (2013) (Isr.) (noting that an Israeli copyright
infringement action against Google regarding Google Book Search met defeat when an Israeli district court ruled
that the lawsuit was ineligible for a class action, without reaching the issue of fair use, and the plaintiff withdrew
his appeal at the recommendation of the Supreme Court).
293. CivC 8303/06 Mejula v. Hanan Cohen (2008) (Isr.).
294. CivC (DC TA) 57588-05-12 Danon PR Telecommunications v. Shelly Yachimovich (2012) (Isr.).
295. CivC 48263-11-13 Ronen v. Let the Animals Live (2016) (Isr.).
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headlines by an online news website using RSS.296 In any event, it remains to be
seen whether subsequent Israeli cases will broadly apply the transformative use
approach and, if so, whether that will translate into more favorable fair use
outcomes for defendants as it has in the United States.
6.

The Factors that Drive Israeli Fair Use

Our Israel Study identified four factors that had a statistically significant
correlation with fair use outcomes and that were applied by courts in enough
cases to provide a possible explanation for what has driven Israeli fair use
outcomes and doctrine. We note that given the relatively small size of our data
set and given that each of those factors had a strong, independent statistically
significant correlation with fair use outcome, logistic regression analysis is not
suited to our study. We, accordingly, look to bivariate correlations and an
assessment of the number of cases in which courts rule on the relevant factor to
determine the extent to which that factor might explain fair use outcomes.
We also compare Israeli court treatment of these factors with that of U.S.
courts. In so doing, we identify a sharp distinction between Israeli and U.S. fair
use doctrine during the ten-year period of our study. With one exception, none
of the factors that correlate significantly with fair use outcomes in Israel
correlate significantly with fair use outcomes in the United States. Indeed, what
appear to be the highly influential factors in Israel generally have a decidedly
marginal impact on fair use outcomes and doctrine in the United States.
a. Commercial Use
As discussed in Part III, the U.S. copyright industries who lobbied against
Israel’s adoption of fair use raised particular concern that, as drafted, Israel’s fair
use provision omits any express mention of the commercial nature of the use
and would thus encourage Israeli courts to liberally award fair use to commercial
uses of copyright-protected works.
Ironically, however, our Israel Study reveals that, in fact, Israeli courts
appear to have weighed the commercial nature of the use far more heavily
against fair use than do their U.S. counterparts. In our Israel Study, over 90% of
the twenty-three rulings that found that the allegedly infringing use was
commercial proceeded to reject the fair use defense.297 Conversely, in six out
seven cases (85.7%) in which the court explicitly found that the use was not
commercial, the court ruled in favor of fair use, also a statistically significant
correlation.298
By contrast, our U.S. Study found that the court ruled against the defendant
on fair use in only half the cases in which the court characterized the use as

296. CivC 45536-07-11 Tomer Apfeldorf v. Yoav Itzhak (2013) (Isr.).
297. A two-sided measure of statistical correlation between finding that use is commercial and fair use
outcome is Chi-Square p=0.0048.
298. Per the Fisher’s exact test, the two-sided measure of statistical correlation between finding that use is
not commercial and fair use outcome is two-sided p<= 0.0016.
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commercial. In the United States, a judicial finding that the defendant’s use was
commercial thus correlated with the court’s rejection of the defendant’s fair use
defense with no higher odds than would be predicted from flipping a coin. On
the other hand, when courts characterized the use as non-commercial, they ruled,
similarly to Israeli courts, that the use was fair use in an overwhelming 83.9%
of the cases.299 Finally, when U.S. courts characterized the use as both
commercial and transformative, they ruled that the use was fair use in 80% of
the cases and that the use was not fair use in only 8.9% of the cases (with the
remainder either questions of fact or mixed).
FIGURE 4. PERCENTAGE OF COURTS IN U.S. AND ISRAEL FINDING FAIR USE
WHEN USE IS COMMERCIAL
Court Finds Fair Use when Use is Commercial
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The striking difference between Israel and the United States in fair use
outcomes when the court finds the use to be commercial is also reflected in the
respective courts’ express statements about the weight to be accorded to the
commercial nature of the use in fair use analysis. In our Israel Study, 47% of the
rulings expressly stated that the commercial nature of the use is to be weighed
against fair use.300 Of these, seven rulings stated expressly that no commercial
use may qualify as fair use and thirteen rulings stated that the commercial nature
of the use is an important, but not disqualifying, factor weighing against fair use.
Further, another six rulings expressly weighed the commercial nature of the use
heavily against fair use without specifying whether commercial nature
disqualifies a use from being fair use or merely weighs significantly against it.
299. All in all, the correlation between commercial character and fair use outcome was statistically
significant, at Pearson Chi Square p = 0.005.
300. Of those rulings, 48% defined commercial use as a use that is designed to reap a profit and 36%, more
broadly, a use designed to reap any benefit for the defendant, including enhancement to reputation. An additional
16% did not define commercial use. No Israeli court used the phraseology that appears in some U.S. fair use
cases to the effect that a commercial use is one in which the defendant fails to pay the customary price for the
use.
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Only one ruling stated that the commercial nature of the use is of marginal
weight in determining fair use.
By contrast, our U.S. Study found that no court stated that a commercial
use may never be a fair use and only 11.3% of the rulings stated that commercial
uses are generally presumed to be unfair and/or to cause market harm. Further,
in 37.8% of the rulings, U.S. courts expressly minimized the importance of the
commercial nature of the use, such as by stating that if the use is transformative,
the commercial character weighs little against fair use.
Notably, however, the Israeli Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Nestlé
appears to signal a closer alignment of Israeli and U.S. fair use on the issue of
commercial use. In Nestlé, the Court stated that the Knesset’s omission of
explicit reference to the commercial nature of the use in section 19(b)(1) was
meant to clarify that fair use is not to be categorically denied to commercial
uses.301 Rather, in line with U.S. fair use doctrine, courts are to consider both the
use’s commercial nature and whether the use is transformative, but must give
less weight to the former than the latter.302 As with other aspects of the Court’s
ruling in Nestlé, it remains to be seen how lower courts will interpret and apply
that clarification regarding commercial use.
b. Authorship Attribution
The defendant’s failure to give authorship attribution appeared to weigh
heavily against fair use in our Israel Study. Courts’ ruling on fair use defenses
found that the defendant had failed to give the author adequate credit in twentytwo cases, or 40% of the cases in our data set. The court rejected the defendant’s
fair use defense in all but one of those cases.303
Some further explanation is in order. Israel’s Copyright Law 2007
recognizes authors’ moral right of attribution.304 The author’s moral right of
attribution, namely to have his name identified with his work, is limited to “the
extent and in the manner suitable in the circumstances.”305 As in other countries,
under Israeli law, the author’s moral right is a personal right that is distinct from
the author’s copyright.306 By the same token, fair use applies only to any
unauthorized use of the copyright owner’s economic rights, not the moral right
of attribution. Unlike some statutory fair dealing and fair use provisions in other
countries, section 19 does not explicitly require authorship attribution as a

301. CivA 3425/17 Société des Produits Nestlé v. Espresso Club Ltd. 47–48 (2019) (Isr.).
302. Id. at 46–47.
303. The correlation between failure to give authorship credit and fair use outcome is statistically significant,
at Pearson Chi Square p = 0.0011.
304. Moral rights under the 2007 Act consist of the right of attribution Section 46(1) and the right to protect
the integrity of the work against distortion that may be prejudicial to the author’s honor or reputation (Section
46(2)). § 46(1)–(2), Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH 2119 38 (Isr.).
305. Id.
306. See generally MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW
TECHNOLOGY (2011).
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condition to the fair use defense.307 Nonetheless, our Israel Study demonstrated
that courts have repeatedly considered the lack of attribution in determining fair
use.
Authors brought a claim for infringement of their moral right of attribution
in addition to a claim of copyright infringement in 56.4% of the fair use cases in
our Israel Study. The court ruled that the defendant had infringed the author’s
moral right of attribution by failing to give the author adequate credit in twentytwo of those cases. As just noted, the court rejected the fair use defense to the
author’s copyright infringement claim in all but one of those twenty-two cases.
By contrast, the defendant’s failure to give authorship attribution is
virtually a non-issue in the United States, where the Copyright Act contains no
general recognition of authors’ moral right. In our U.S. Study, only two rulings
(1.1% of the total) stated that failure to give authorship attribution can weigh
against fair use and two rulings state the opposite, that failure to give credit to
the author is irrelevant. Nor does the fact that the defendant gave authorship
attribution generally weigh in favor of fair use. Only three rulings (1.6%) in our
U.S. Study stated that giving authorship attribution can weigh in favor of fair
use, and one expressly stated that the fact that the defendant credited the author
was irrelevant to fair use analysis.
A handful of U.S. fair use rulings prior to the ten-year period of our study
gave some weight to authorship attribution.308 But our empirical study and
careful reading of fair use doctrine reinforce our conclusion that authorship
attribution generally weighs little, if at all, in U.S. fair use case law. As an earlier
study concludes, despite courts’ occasional reference to authorship attribution
as an equitable consideration for fair use, it is “most certainly not the case” that
“attribution is regularly considered by courts as a factor in the fair use
analysis.”309 Again, that stands in sharp contrast to the considerable weight given
to authorship attribution by Israeli courts.
Having said that, however, the Israeli Supreme Court’s recent ruling in
Nestlé might move Israeli fair use doctrine closer to that of the United States
along this vector as well. Nestlé did not hold explicitly that failure to give
authorship attribution is irrelevant to fair use. But it repeatedly highlighted the
distinction between an author’s moral rights and the economic rights of the
copyright owner, and stated that an author’s recourse for violation of his or her

307. Fair dealing provisions in several countries require reasonable authorship attribution as a condition to
qualifying for the defense. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Most Moral of Rights: The Right to Be Recognized as the
Author of One’s Work, 8 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 44, 53 n.30 (2016) (citing fair dealing provisions of
several countries, including the United Kingdom). Some newly enacted fair use provisions explicitly require
authorship attribution as well. See, e.g., Copyright Amendment Bill B 13B—2017 § 12A(c) (S. Af.) (enacted,
but not yet signed into law); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 184.1(e), Rep. Act No. 8293 (Phil.) (requiring
authorship attribution for certain uses).
308. See, e.g., Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding newspaper’s
attribution of authorship weighed in favor of fair use); Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir.
1989) (finding plagiarism weighed against fair use); see also Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir.
1983).
309. Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41, 88 (2007).
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moral rights lies only in the moral rights provisions of the Copyright Law 2007,
not in the copyright provisions.310 Further, the fact that the Nespresso had failed
to credit the author of the creative expression that it copied was conspicuously
absent from the Court’s fair use analysis. The Court did not even mention the
defendant’s failure to give authorship attribution, let alone give it any weight.
c.

The Defendant’s Purpose of Use

As discussed above, section 19 of the Israel Copyright Law 2007 sets out a twopart test for fair use.311 Section 19(a) provides: “Fair use of a work is permitted
for purposes such as private study, research, criticism, review, journalistic
reporting, quotation, or instruction and examination by an educational
institution.”312 In contrast to Israel’s previous fair dealing exception, section
19(a) is meant to set out an open list of permissible purposes. Uses other than
the enumerated uses may qualify as fair use. However, to qualify as fair use, the
defendant’s use must be “such as” one or more of the enumerated uses in some
way. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Nestlé, section 19 sets out two
requirements for a finding of fair use: purpose and fairness. The Court explicitly
held that “the language of section 19(a) does not allow renouncing the purpose
test as an independent preliminary test.”313 At the same time, as discussed above,
Israeli courts have broadly interpreted the purpose test.314
In our Israel Study, nineteen rulings (35.5% of the total) expressly found
that the defendant’s use was not one of the uses enumerated in section 19(a). In
all but two of those nineteen rulings, the court rejected the defendant’s fair use
defense, yielding a statistically significant correlation between fair use outcome
and a finding that the defendant’s use is not one of the enumerated uses.315
Notably, moreover, none of those rulings analyzed whether the use in question
was “such as” one or more of the enumerated uses. This suggests that Israeli
courts might be continuing to apply the approach from the previous fair dealing
regime, in which only enumerated uses could qualify for the fair dealing defense,
rather than the more open (although not entirely open) regime set out in section
19. In that vein, only 18% of rulings explicitly acknowledged that the list of
enumerated purposes is an open-ended list.
On the other hand, in 65% of the cases in our Israel Study the court did not
explicitly find that the use failed to satisfy the purpose test. In these cases, the
court found the use to be for one of the purposes enumerated by the clause, or
simply ignored the purpose test all together. In sum, it is not clear whether the

310. CivA 3425/17 Société des Produits Nestlé v. Espresso Club Ltd. 54–55 (2019) (Isr.).
311. See supra notes 191–199 and accompanying text.
312. § 19(a), Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH 2119 38 (Isr.).
313. CivA 3425/17 Société des Produits Nestlé v. Espresso Club Ltd. 31 (2019) (Isr.); see also Elkin-Koren,
supra note 221, at 359–60 (arguing that the language of the statute suggest that the legislator sustained the two
necessary conditions to exempted use drafted by courts prior to the enactment of the Copyright Law 2007,
namely, the purpose of use, and the fairness of use as measured by the four factors).
314. See, e.g., CivA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 48(1) PD 251, 273 (1993) (Isr.).
315. Pearson Chi-Square Pr. 0.0276.
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seventeen rulings that denied fair use after finding that the defendant’s use was
not one of the enumerated purposes were path-dependently applying the
previous closed-list fair dealing regime or simply concluding without discussion
that the defendant’s use was neither an enumerated use nor “such as” the
enumerated uses.
Regardless of the explanation for why Israeli courts seem to apply the
section 19(a) purpose test restrictively, Israeli doctrine differs from that of the
United States on this issue by imposing an additional obstacle before defendants
who claim fair use. Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act also prefaces the list
of enumerated uses in the preambular clause with the phrase “such as.”316 But in
its definitions section, the U.S. Copyright Act provides explicitly that the “terms
‘including’ and ‘such as’ are illustrative and not limitative.”317
Accordingly, U.S. courts interpret § 107 to set out a fully open list of
examples of the types of uses that can qualify as fair use.318 U.S. courts
occasionally state that the fact that the defendant’s use does not fall within one
of the illustrative categories of fair use weighs against fair use.319 However,
Beebe concluded, based on the regression model in his empirical study of U.S.
fair use case law, that “when controlling for the effects of other findings, a
finding that the defendant’s use fell within one of the preambular categories did
not significantly affect the outcome of the fair use test.”320
d. Defendant’s Bad Faith
Our Israel Study found a statistically significant correlation between fair
use outcome and courts’ ruling on whether the defendant had used the plaintiff’s
work in good faith. Israeli courts ruled in favor of fair use in every one of the
four cases in which the court found that the defendant had acted in good faith
and against fair use in every one of the twelve cases in which the court found
that the defendant had not acted in good faith. But the fact that Israeli courts
addressed the issue of the defendant’s good faith in just sixteen cases, slightly
less than a third of our data set, suggests that this factor has somewhat weaker
explanatory power for fair use outcomes than do the commercial character of the
use, authorship credit, and a judicial finding that the defendant’s use did not meet
the purpose test.
Our U.S. Study found that the issue of whether the defendant acted in good
faith is quite marginal in the U.S. fair use doctrine. In our U.S. Study, only
eighteen rulings (just under 10% of the total) addressed the issue of whether the
defendant acted in good faith, and of those, three rulings stated that the

316. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
317. Id. § 101.
318. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] secondary work may constitute a
fair use even if it serves some purpose other than those (criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, and research) identified in the preamble to the statute.” (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994))).
319. See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998).
320. Beebe, supra note 44, at 609–10.
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defendant’s good or bad faith is irrelevant to whether the defendant’s use
qualifies as fair use.321 Likewise, Beebe’s empirical study of fair use cases found
that, while a judicial finding of bad faith on the part of the copyright
infringement defendant correlated significantly with the court’s rejection of the
fair use defense, only 16% of the cases made reference to the propriety of the
defendant’s conduct. Further, Beebe’s regression analysis suggested that a
finding of bad faith served little role in fair use outcomes keeping other factors
and subfactors constant.322

CONCLUSION
In campaigning against the adoption of fair use outside the United States,
U.S. copyright industries warn policy makers around the world that introducing
fair use would undermine copyright protection. They contend that courts in other
countries lack the capacity to carefully craft the scope of a privileged use, and
insist that the adoption of fair use would thus lead to unrestrained copying.
Our empirical study of fair use case law in one country to have adopted fair
use outside the United States finds no evidence to substantiate these claims. We
find, indeed, that during the first decade in which Israel’s statutory fair use
provision was in effect, Israeli courts were quite restrained in accepting fair use
defense compared to their U.S. counterparts, rejecting fair use defenses in 70.9%
of the cases, compared with a mere 40.5% rejection rate by U.S. courts. While
the courts of other countries that adopt fair use might be more receptive to fair
use defenses than have Israeli courts, our case study makes clear, at the very
least, that the USTR should give no weight to the mere fact that a country has
adopted fair use in determining whether that country should face the threat of
trade sanctions for inadequate intellectual property protection.
Our study further reveals that, notwithstanding Israel’s enactment of
statutory language that was almost identical to § 107, Israeli courts developed
an independent jurisprudence of fair use, putting weight on factors that have
generally played an insignificant role in determining fair use outcomes in the
United States. These factors include the commercial nature of the defendant’s
use, the defendant’s failure to give authorship credit, the purpose of use, and the
extent to which the defendant acted in bad faith. At the same time, however, the
Israeli Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to U.S. fair use case law for
guidance. As we have discussed, indeed, the Court’s recent ruling in Nestlé
might move Israeli fair use jurisprudence closer to that of the United States even
if Nestlé pronounced a uniquely Israeli framework for the four statutory fair use
factors.
Our findings may offer some important lessons to countries considering
the adoption of the fair use exception in their copyright law. Most importantly,
321. See Liu, supra note 52, at 186 (finding that only 17.7% of the U.S. cases in his study addressed the
defendant’s good faith or bad faith).
322. See Beebe, supra note 44, at 595, 609. A more recent study similarly found that although the good
faith/bad faith inquiry has a statistically significant coefficient, the inquiry is so rarely applied as to render that
statistic somewhat meaningless. See Asay et al., supra note 50, at 994 n.226.

April 2021]

TRANSPLANTING FAIR USE ACROSS THE GLOBE

1181

introducing a fair use provision need not, in itself, lead to unrestrained copying.
Far from being a license to unauthorized copying, fair use offers a conceptual
framework for a sophisticated legal analysis weighing the conflicting values and
considerations promoted by copyright law.
Our study has further demonstrated that courts may play a moderating role,
even when empowered with broad discretion. Although fair use is an open-ended
norm which seemingly accords courts wide discretion, judicial decisions in our
study reflected a considerable degree of path dependency. Israeli courts followed
a relatively conservative approach that heavily relied on the legal tradition which
preceded the Knesset’s enactment of fair use. Our findings suggest that, to a
large extent, Israeli courts’ interpretation of the fair use provision looked to the
fair dealing framework which preceded the fair use reform. In particular, in part
because of how the Knesset drafted section 19, Israeli courts have continued the
fair dealing distinction between the purpose test and the fairness test,
interpreting section 19 to require the purpose of use as a precondition to fair use.
U.S. courts have taken a different path in their interpretation of the statutory
language of § 107.
This path dependency of courts should not come as a surprise. Judicial
decisions are shaped by precedent and by briefs submitted by the litigants. The
conceptual framework applied by judges and litigators is further shaped by their
training and experience under the previous law. Courts may play an important
role in legal reform, but they are generally bounded by their legal tradition and
their local legal culture. Consequently, even broad discretion accorded to judges
by an open-ended fair use norm is unlikely to result in dramatic change
overnight.
Finally, our findings underscore the role of courts in copyright reform, and
their contribution to the integration of a legal transplant in local copyright law.
While fair use opponents express concern about delegating to courts a semilegislative power to craft copyright exemptions for new uses, our study suggests
that courts are not only capable of carefully developing legal norms but also of
doing so in a manner that is bound by local legal culture. This could be an
important feature in localizing global copyright norms.
We hope that our study inspires additional, companion studies of how fair
use has been applied in other countries that have adopted the privilege. Such
studies would shed greater light on how fair use is actually transplanted outside
the United States. They would provide the necessary empirical data to compare
transplanting countries’ approaches to fair use with one another and with
evolving fair use doctrine in the United States.
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